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INTRODUCTION
Following the massive failure of the savings and loan industry,
the federal government sought to recover some of the enormous
losses to the banking system and federal insurance coffers from
those responsible for the management of these institutions. The
authority was placed in the hands of the Resolution Trust Corpora-
tion (RTC), Congress's avenging angel. On behalf of failing
corporations, the RTC brought hundreds of suits against former
officers and directors.' The RTC, however, was inhibited by a
serious obstacle-many of these claims were barred under applicable
state statutes of limitations. The RTC needed a mechanism to
resurrect these otherwise stale claims. It found such a device in the
doctrine of adverse domination.
During the early decades of this century, some courts refused to
allow a corporation's cause of action against its board of directors
to accrue as long as the board remained in control of the corpora-
tion, thus precluding the running of the statute of limitations.
2
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This Comment is dedicated to my family and friends, whose support and encourage-
ment have made this Comment and all I have done possible. Thank you.
'See, e.g., Edward L. Morris, S&L Suits: Unjust, Yes but Coming to an End, NAT'L
L.J., Oct. 18, 1993, at 15 (noting that there are "300 pending suits against the former
managers and advisors of some 200 institutions"); Susan Schmidt, Arizona Governor
Terms RTC Suit "Witch Hunt" WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 1992, at F1 (describing Arizona
GovernorJ. Fife Symington's complaint that the RTC pursued claims too aggressive-
ly).
2 See, e.g., Adams v. Clarke, 22 F.2d 957, 959 (9th Cir. 1927) ("As trustees in
exclusive control of the bank's affairs, [the directors] cannot take advantage of
inaction for which they alone are responsible [to prevent the running of the statute
of limitations]."); Schilling v. Parman, 35 F.2d 780, 781 (D. Or. 1928) ("[T]he statute
of limitations will not run in favor of the directors of a bank who have the control
and management of its affairs while they remain in control."); cf. Curtis v. Connly,
257 U.S. 260, 263-64 (1921) (conferring knowledge of director wrongdoing to a bank
when three new directors were placed on board).
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The rationale behind this early adverse domination doctrine was
that control of a corporation by those alleged to have harmed it
rendered the corporation incapable of bringing suit.' The doctrine
was rarely used after 1940,' until the RTC discovered that it could
use the doctrine to revive claims against former directors of
financial institutions under the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA).5
The present formulation of the adverse domination doctrine
varies in application depending on the jurisdiction. Most courts
that accept adverse domination, however, do so for the same
underlying purpose: "[T]he corporation which can only act through
the controlling wrongdoers cannot reasonably be expected to
pursue a claim which it has against them until they are no longer in
control."' Application of the doctrine tolls the running of the
statute of limitations for a corporation's cause of action against its
directors until those directors no longer control the corporation.
It is now generally accepted that state law governs the tolling of
statutes of limitations under FIRREA.7 The increase of litigation
3 See Schilling, 35 F.2d at 781 (comparing the relationship to that of a cestui que
trust); Whitten v. Dabney, 154 P. 312, 315-16 (Cal. 1915) (comparing the disability of
a corporation to the "minority of an infant"); see also Note, The Statute of Limitations
in Stockholders' Derivative Suits Against Directors, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 842, 857 (1939)
(arguing that "although directors are not ordinarily trustees, the fact of control puts
the corporation in the position of a cestui of a trust, disabled from making an adverse
claim").
" See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Scaletty, No. 72,230, 1995 WL 111986, at *4 (Kan.
Mar. 17, 1995) (noting that "[m]ost reported cases referring to the [adverse
domination] doctrine were decided in the 1980's and '90's"). But see International
Rys. of Cent. Am. v. United Fruit Co., 373 F.2d 408, 414 (2d Cir.) (applying the
adverse domination doctrine), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 921 (1967); Federal Deposit Ins.
Corp. v. Bird, 516 F. Supp. 647, 651 (D.P.R. 1981) (same). Because it was poorly
understood, the adverse domination doctrine was used infrequently; with the increas-
ing use of fraudulent concealment and the discovery rule, see infra part I.B, it was all
but forgotten.
Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 15
U.S.C., and 18 U.S.C.); see infra notes 58-70 and accompanying text (discussing
FIRREA).
6 Resolution Trust Corp. v. Farmer, 865 F. Supp. 1143, 1151 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
7 See O'Melveny & Myers v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 114 S. Ct. 2048, 2054
(1994) (holding that because the RTC originally brought state-law claims, state law
governs the question of imputation of knowledge to the FDIC from the corporate
officers and directors); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Artley, 28 F.3d 1099, 1102 (11th
Cir. 1994) (applying state law to the question of adverse domination based on the
O'Melveny rationale). But see Farmers & Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Bryan, 902 F.2d
1520, 1522 (10th Cir. 1990) (applying federal common law to toll the statute of
limitations under the adverse domination doctrine).
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involving adverse domination under FIRREA has begun to mold
state law on the issue8 and has increased the likelihood that the
doctrine will be used more frequently to toll the statutes of limita-
tions in other lawsuits against directors of corporations.9 Thus, the
issue will be resolved in state courts, using the law as it develops
under FIRREA to shape the development of adverse domination in
these state courts." It is especially important that the doctrine be
clearly understood so that state courts confronted with allegations
of adverse domination will understand its proper application.
This Comment has two basic purposes: to discern the true
nature of the adverse domination doctrine and to determine
whether the result is a desirable rule for courts to apply. First,
some grounding in limitations law and the nature of adverse
domination is necessary. Thus, Part I will discuss the historical
origins of statutes of limitations, their underlying purposes, and the
development of the law regarding the tolling of these statutes. Part
II will analyze the specific application of the adverse domination
doctrine, concentrating on the increased use of the doctrine in the
federal courts by the RTC and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) under FIRREA. This Part will expose the four
primary inconsistencies in the application of the doctrine: the
degree of domination required by the board of directors, the
required level of culpability to which directors' actions must rise,
whether the doctrine is applicable to toll the statute of limitations
against nondirectors, and the burden of proof. Part III will analyze
adverse domination under corporate and agency law to determine
the legal posture of the doctrine under limitations law. This
analysis will reveal that the theoretical underpinnings of the
doctrine are most analogous to the discovery rule, another common-
law method of delaying the accrual of a cause of action.
With this essential structure established, Part IV will apply
adverse domination as a variant of the discovery rule, resolving the
8 For example, the Farmer court noted that Pennsylvania had not explicitly
recognized the doctrine of adverse domination but held that the state supreme court
likely would find it applicable as a variant of the discovery rule and the fraudulent
concealment doctrine. See Farmer, 865 F. Supp. at 1152-54.
1 See e.g., Clark v. Milam, 452 S.E.2d 714, 718-20 (W. Va. 1994) (adopting the
adverse domination doctrine in the context of an insurance company).
o See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Scaletty, No. 72,230, 1995 WL 111986, at *3-*7
(Kan. Mar. 17,1995) (developing adverse domination doctrine for Kansas); Clark, 452
S.E.2d at 718 (developing adverse domination for West Virginia using RTC and FDIC
cases).
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inconsistent application that has plagued its history in the federal
courts. Analyzing adverse domination under the discovery rule
requires a board of directors in which all knowledgeable directors
are wrongdoing directors. The directors need only be negligent for
the rule to apply, and the doctrine may also be applied to toll a
corporation's cause of action against a nondirector who was
involved in the underlying transaction. Finally, the burden of
proving domination should be placed on the plaintiffs.
Having satisfied the first goal of discerning a uniform rule that
courts are likely to apply according to contemporary case law, this
Comment then questions the desirability of such a rule. Part V will
analyze the effects of adverse domination, determining that its
application would almost entirely eliminate the important policy
goal behind statutes of limitations-repose. It will be argued that
courts have become extremely liberal in their application of the
discovery rule because they believe that the limitations periods
prescribed by legislatures are too short. As a response, this
Comment will suggest that legislatures supplement their statutes of
limitations with longer statutes of repose (limitation periods that
cannot be tolled by courts), which would create an upper limit to
the time in which a cause of action may be brought.
I. THE HISTORY OF STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS AND THE
ORIGINS OF TOLLING PROVISIONS
Statutes of limitations restrict the amount of time in which
plaintiffs may bring their causes of action to court." Statutes of
limitations were originally strict statutes of repose that prevented
plaintiffs from bringing suit after the prescribed time periods unless
the statutes explicitly provided exceptions. 2 Eventually, however,
statutes of limitations became subject to provisions that tolled the
n See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5501-5574 (1981 & Supp. 1994) (Penn-
sylvania's statutes of limitations); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.16.005-.370 (West 1988
& Supp. 1994) (Washington's statutes of limitations); see also Christopher R. Leslie,
Den of Inequity: The Case for Equitable Doctrines in Rule lOb-5 Cases, 81 CAL. L. REV.
1587, 1589 (1993) ("A statute of limitations defines the time period in which a
plaintiff must bring suit against a defendant. As a rule, if the statute of limitations
expires, a plaintiff may not bring a suit, regardless of its merits."); Developments in the
Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1179 (1950) [hereinafter
Developments] (describing the form of typical statutes of limitations).
" See Gail L. Heriot, A Study in the Choice of Form: Statutes of Limitation and the
Doctrine of Laches, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 917, 927 ("In the early nineteenth century,
most American courts applied statutes of limitation quite formalistically .... ").
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statutes under certain circumstances, thereby extending the time in
which plaintiffs could bring suit.'- This Part will explore the origins
of limitations law, both at law and in equity, and the purposes
served by statutes of limitations. This Part will then explore the
development of tolling provisions from their origins in courts of
equity under the doctrine of laches to their current expansive use
in courts of law under the discovery rule.
A. The Development of Statutes of Limitations
The history of limitations of action extends back at least to
Roman times, when limitations were placed on actions to recover
real property. 4 Early English common-law courts placed no time
limitations on causes of action, believing this to be "the responsibili-
ty or prerogative of the king or the Parliament, which acted
infrequently and on an ad hoc basis."" The modern era of
statutes of limitations did not begin until the Limitations Act of
1623 was enacted. 6 This statute, promulgated under the reign of
James I, "provided specific lengths of time for numerous real
property and personal actions." 17  Certain explicit disabilities
suspended the running of the statute."8 Because the English legal
system was the basis of American law, American legislatures enacted
general statutes of limitations early in their histories.'
9
Statutes of limitations generally are perceived as having two
purposes: a "substantive" purpose in granting repose to defendants
and a "procedural" purpose in encouraging plaintiffs to bring suit
in a timely manner.2' The substantive purpose of repose for
"s See infra notes 33-54 and accompanying text (describing the development of
laws permitting the tolling of statutes of limitations).1
4 See RUDOLPH SOHM, THE INSTITUTES: A TEXTBOOK OF THE HISTORY AND
SYSTEM OF ROMAN PRIvATE LAW 282-84 (James C. Ledlie trans., Oxford Univ. Press
3d ed. 1907); Heriot, supra note 12, at 923; Developments, supra note 11, at 1177.
" Heriot, supra note 12, at 924.
16 Limitations Act, 1623, 21 Jam., ch. 16 (Eng.); see also Heriot, supra note 12, at
926 (stating that the Limitations Act"mark[ed] the advent of reasonably effective and
systematic rules to govern time limitation"); Developments, supra note 11, at 1178 ("The
Limitations Act of 1623 marks the beginning of the modern law of limitations on
personal actions in the common law.").
' Heriot, supra note 12, at 926.
'1 See id. (explaining that the Limitations Act could be tolled for "infancy, insanity,
imprisonment, coverture, and absence from the realm").
"9 See Developments, supra note 11, at 1179.
21 See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717,736 (1988) (Brennan,J., concurring)
("The statute of limitations a State enacts represents a balance... of its procedural
interestin freeingits courts from adjudicating stale claims and its substantive interest
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defendants is the primary, driving force behind these statutes:
Statutes of limitation ... in their conclusive effects are designed
to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of
claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been
lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared. The
theory is that even if one has ajust claim it is unjust not to put the
adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and
that the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail
over the right to prosecute them.
2 1
This right of repose for defendants makes intuitive sense. For
example, it would be unfair and unjust to hold a director of a
corporation liable for simple negligence forty years after the alleged
infraction.
22
Although repose to defendants is the primary purpose of
statutes of limitations, encouraging timely action by plaintiffs to
promote the efficient management of the court system is an
important secondary goal.2' By promoting prompt filing of suits,
the courts, and presumably society, benefit by avoiding excessive
backlogs of ancient causes of action. 24  A careful look at both
in giving individuals repose from ancient breaches of law."); Wood v. Carpenter, 101
U.S. 135, 139 (1879) ("Statutes of limitation are vital to the welfare of society and are
favored in the law .... They promote repose by giving security and stability to human
affairs.... They stimulate to activity and punish negligence."); Developments, supra
note 11, at 1185 (stating that statutes of limitations grant repose to defendants and
relieve courts of the burden of hearing stale claims); Neil E. Grayson, Note, Defenses
to the Statute of Limitations in Federal Securities Cases: The Fraudulent Concealment
Doctrine and the Investment Decision Doctrine, 38 S.C. L. REV. 789, 789 (1987) (noting
that statutes of limitations encourage prompt filing of suits and protect potential
defendants).
21 Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-49
(1944); see also Developments, supra note 11, at 1185 ("The primary consideration
underlying [statutes of limitations] is undoubtedly one of fairness to the defendant.");
Note, supra note 3, at 843 ("The general policy of the statute of limitations is one of
repose . . . ." (footnote omitted)).
' This important concept will be illustrated through the use of a hypothetical. See
infra text accompanying notes 211-16.
2- See Developments, supra note 11, at 1185.
24 See Christopher P. Edwards, Tyson v. L'eggs Products, Inc.: The North Carolina
Court of Appeals Provides a Solution to the Business Name Game, 66 N.C. L. REV. 1064,
1077 (1988) ("North Carolina would be well-advised to adopt a... statute that strives
to equalize society's interest in affording injured plaintiffs a meaningful opportunity
for legal recourse with the concomitant interest in maintaining an efficient judicial
system."); David H. Hollander,Jr. et al., Survey, Developments in Maryland Law, 1988-
89,49 MD. L. REV. 750, 779-82 (1990) (discussing the importance ofjudicial economy
and expressing concern as to whether the discovery rule will promote such economy);
Note, Claim Preclusion in Modern Latent Disease Cases: A Proposal for Allowing Second
Suits, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1989, 1994 (1990) (noting that both claim preclusion and
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purposes of statutes of limitations shows that they have one
overriding goal: to encourage plaintiffs to bring timely suits,
thereby protecting both defendants and the courts.25
B. The Development of Doctrines Designed to Toll
the Statute of Limitations
Originally, statutes of limitations were interpreted as rigid legal
rules with little room for maneuvering. 21 Such limitations periods,
statutes of limitations "seek efficiency for the judicial system and tranquility for the
defendant"); ef. Pennwalt Corp. v. Nasios, 550 A.2d 1155, 1167 (Md. 1988) (noting
that the discovery rule promotes judicial economy in medical malpractice cases).
The "substance-procedure dichotomy" is of primary importance for conflict of
law purposes when a forum court is entitled to apply its own statute of limitations if
the statute is considered procedural. See Wortman, 486 U.S. at 724-26 (noting that at
the time of the adoption of the Constitution, statutes of limitations were traditionally
procedural for conflict of law purposes, and thus the forum applied its own law);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 142-143 (1969) (explaining that the
forum state's statute of limitations governs, not that of the state in which the action
arose, unless the foreign state's statute of limitations bars the substantive right, not
merely the remedy). In reality, the practical differences between the substantive and
procedural aspects of the statutes are not particularly important in most contexts.
For example, in a plurality opinion byJustice Scalia, the Supreme Court in Wortman
held that for purposes of conflict of laws, statutes of limitations are procedural,
meaning that the forum state is entitled to apply its own statute of limitations to the
case. See Wortman, 486 U.S. at 724-25. Justice Scalia noted, however, that statutes of
limitations are still substantive for purposes of federal court application of state
forum law under the Erie doctrine. See id. at 726-28 (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938)). The Supreme Court had previously established that federal
courts sitting in diversity must apply the forum state's statute of limitations. See
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945) (noting that because statutes of
limitations so "intimately affect recovery or non-recovery a federal court in a diversity
case should follow State law" to maintain consistent results among different forums).
As the Court noted in Wortman: "Except at the extremes, the term 'substance' and
'procedure' precisely describe very little except a dichotomy, and what they mean in
a particular context is largely determined by the purposes for which the dichotomy
is drawn." Wortman, 486 U.S. at 726.
' The remainder of this Comment will focus on the substantive purpose of
limitations-repose. As will be shown, the various applications of the adverse
domination doctrine will not undermine the policy of encouraging timely suits.
Because adverse domination requires actual ignorance on the plaintiff's part, see infra
notes 185-89 and accompanying text, the policy of encouraging timely suit is not
implicated because it is impossible to encourage someone to sue on a cause of action
of which she is unaware. Cf Pennwalt, 550 A.2d at 1167 (noting that society's interest
in judicial economy is actually enhanced by the discovery rule because otherwise
plaintiffs would file actions immediately without full knowledge of the underlying
claim). Thus, the procedural policy underlying the statute of limitations will not be
affected by the adverse domination doctrine.
26 See Developments, supra note 11, at 1188-89 ("Apparently the exceptions
engrafted upon the limitations statutes by the early courts were a manifestation of a
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however, governed only actions at law. Equity was governed by the
doctrine of laches. Laches is based on the same policies as statutes
of limitations.27 Unlike statutes of limitations, however, laches is
left to the discretion of judges.2' Thus, laches is a more flexible
doctrine-a legal standard, as compared to the rigid legal rules of
early statutes of limitations.
2 9
The flexibility associated with the doctrine of laches gave
impetus to the concept of tolling limitation periods. The general
rule of laches focused on plaintiffs' diligence in. pursuit of their
causes of action. If plaintiffs did not bring suit within a reasonable
time period, their actions were barred. 0 In other words, laches
was designed to give plaintiffs a reasonable opportunity to bring
suit.
By the end of the nineteenth century, equity courts generally
adopted the limitation periods found in analogous statutes of
limitations at law."' The doctrine of laches recognized certain
disabilities, such as insanity or incapacity, that would prevent the
statute of limitations from running.32  Equity courts had more
discretion than law courts, however, and they began to go beyond
the explicit disabilities mentioned in the analogous statute of
reaction to the rigidity of the arbitrarily fixed time periods."); Note, supra note 3, at
844 ("Definite statutory enactments seeking to make concrete these policies [behind
statutes of limitations] have incorporated arbitrary rules, which from time to time
have resulted in hard cases." (footnote omitted)).
27 See Developments, supra note 11, at 1184.
28 See Heriot, supra note 12, at 927 ("In the nineteenth century, equity courts
decided the laches question according to the special circumstances of each case.
Power was vested in the equity judge to do what was best." (footnote omitted)).
29 See id. (noting that early American courts applied statutes of limitations rigidly,
while equity courts were more liberal with laches); see also infra part V (discussing
whether such power should be vested in judges).
" See Developments, supra note 11, at 1184 ("Traditionally, there is no laches unless
the plaintiffs knew, or reasonably should have known, of the existence of the cause
of action, and unless the delay was prejudicial to the defendant."); see also Heriot,
supra note 12, at 926-27 (discussing the development of laches).
3
1 
See H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATION OF ACTIONS AT LAW AND IN
EQUITY 108-10 (1883) (-Courts of equity, although not in all cases bound by the
statute of limitations ... have nevertheless ... given effect to the statute. . . ."); cf.
LymanJohnson, Securities Fraud and the Mirage of Repose, 1992 WIs. L. REv. 607, 641
(noting that "by the mid-19th century, the weight of American authority was that...
postponement of a limitations period was proper at law as well as in equity").
2 See, e.g., supra note 18 and accompanying text (stating that early statutes of
limitations had several explicit conditions that would toll the statute). Laches granted
the same exceptions. See Developments, supra note 11, at 1184 ("Since the concept of
laches requires that the plaintiff have had a reasonable opportunity to bring suit,
various disabilities similar to those recognized at law will excuse a delay.").
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limitations. Equity courts created the doctrine of equitable tolling
in causes of action involving fraud: "[I]n cases where relief is
sought upon the ground of fraud on the part of the defendant, the
courts, in a proper case, depart from this rule [of strict interpreta-
tion], and will give relief, unless the plaintiff has been guilty of
unreasonable laches in seeking his remedy in equity."3 3 Here lies
the origin of the doctrine of fraudulent concealment.
There is some disagreement as to the application of the
fraudulent concealment doctrine. In some cases, a bare allegation
of fraud in the underlying cause of action is sufficient to toll the
statute of limitations under the fraudulent concealment doctrine.
3 4
Most of these fraud cases, however, also require that the plaintiff be
diligent in determining whether the cause of action exists. 5 Thus,
affirmative misrepresentation by the defendant may not be required
when the underlying cause of action is based on fraud. 6 The
modern trend, as fraudulent concealment began to be applied to
causes of action other than fraud, is that some type of affirmative
concealment is required on the part of the defendant in order for
the plaintiff to invoke the doctrine.
3 7
33 WOOD, supra note 31, at 113-14.
' See, e.g., Holmbergv. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392,397 (1946). The Holmberg Court
stated:
[T]his Court long ago adopted as its own the old chancery rule that where
a plaintiff has been injured by fraud and "remains in ignorance of it without
any fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of the statute does
not begin to run until the fraud is discovered, though there be no special
circumstances or efforts on the part of the party committing the fraud to
conceal it from the knowledge of the other party."
Id. (quoting Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 348 (1874)).
35 See WOOD, supra note 31, at 114 (stating that allegations of fraud will not toll
the statute if "the plaintiff has been guilty of unreasonable laches in seeking his
remedy"); Grayson, supra note 20, at 803 ("When a fraud goes undiscovered, even
though the defendant does nothing affirmative to conceal it, the plaintiff must be
duly diligent to toll the limitations period.").
" See infra note 116 and accompanying text. Affirmative concealment by the
defendant is often not required when the fraud is "inherently difficult to discover."
Grayson, supra note 20, at 800. An example is securities fraud cases. See Leslie, supra
note 11, at 1594 ("[B]ecause securities fraud is often self-concealing, many courts
have held that additional fraudulent concealment is not necessary to toll the statute
of limitations .... ").
s' SeeJohn P. Dawson, Fraudulent Concealment and Statutes of Limitation, 31 MICH.
L. REV. 875,880 (1933) ("In examining the factual bases for suspension of the statute
(courts] were led beyond a scrutiny of the original cause ofaction and of theplaintiffs
later opportunities for discovery, to an emphasis on the means by which the defendant
obstructed discovery."); Developments, supra note 11, at 1221 ("Ordinarily the acts of
concealment must consist of affirmative misrepresentation or active conduct.. ").
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Just as equity courts were adopting the limitations periods from
statutes of limitations for the analogous action at law, law courts
began to recognize equitable doctrines for tolling statutes of
limitations.3 8  In what one author has termed "convergence,"
statutes of limitations became more standard-like, and thus laches-
like, as traditional equitable actions became actionable at law. 9
State law courts adopted the fraudulent concealment doctrine in
cases based on nonfraud as well as fraud, often accompanied by
legislative actions in the adoption of fraudulent concealment
statutes.4 ° Most of these states require some sort of affirmative
misrepresentation to toll the statute for fraudulent concealment.4 1
Several recent cases have held that affirmative misrepresentation is generally required,
but that it might not be required in cases involving a fiduciary relationship. See, e.g.,
Litman v. Prudential-Bache Properties, No. CIV.A.12137, 1994 WL 30529, at *3 (Del.
Ch. Jan. 14, 1994) ("I think the better rule.., is that a limitations period may be
tolled absent allegations of affirmative acts ofconcealment by the defendants, where
the parties to the litigation stand in a fiduciary relationship to each other .... ");
Continental Potash, Inc. v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 858 P.2d 66, 77 (N.M. 1993)
("Absent a fiduciary duty to speak on the part of the defendants, however, silence,
nondisclosure, or denials of alleged fraudulent conduct are insufficient to constitute
fraudulent concealment so as to toll a statute of limitations."), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1064 (1994).
ss See Moviecolor Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80,83 (2d Cir.) (recounting
how law courts incorporated equitable doctrines for tolling statutes of limitations),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 821 (1961); Heriot, supra note 12, at 954-55 (discussing the
courts' tendency to "move the statute of limitations in the direction of... laches");
Developments, supra note 11, at 1213 (indicating that "equitable grounds for relief
became available at law"); Grayson, supra note 20, at 799 (noting that courts applied
equitable tolling principles to "congressionally set limitations periods").
" See Heriot, supra note 12, at 952-62 (arguing that the doctrine of laches has
been absorbed by courts interpreting the statute of limitations); see also Developments,
supra note 11, at 1213 (discussing the phenomena in which "equitable grounds for
relief became actionable at law"); infra part V (discussing whether statutes of
limitations should be read so broadly).
40 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 9.10.055 (1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-56-112 (Michie
1987); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 337.15 (West 1982); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5532
(1981).
41 See, e.g., Hampton v. Taylor, 887 S.W.2d 535, 540 (Ark. 1994) ("Absent active
concealment, the statute of limitations is not tolled."); Upah v. Ancona Bros., 521
N.W.2d 895, 905 (Neb. 1994) ("Generally, for fraudulent concealment to delay
running of the statute of limitations, the concealment must be manifested by an
affirmative act or misrepresentation."); Krevitz v. City of Philadelphia, 648 A.2d 353,
357 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994) ("[M]ere silence or nondisclosure is not enough[;]... the
adversary must commit some affirmative independent act of concealment upon which
the plaintiffsjustifiably rely.... ."). But see Wisher v. Higgs, 849 P.2d 152, 160 (Mont.
1993) ("The language of [the fraudulent concealment statute] indicates that simply
failure to disclose facts, as opposed to affirmative, fraudulent concealment, is
sufficient to toll the statute .... ").
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Fraudulent concealment was only the beginning of the tolling
revolution in the interpretation of statutes of limitations. More
change occurred as courts began to interpret the word "accrue,"
which appears in most statutes of limitations.4 2 Here lies the origin
of the discovery rule, a broader tolling provision than fraudulent
concealment that "toll[s] the commencement of the limitations
period when [the] plaintiff is excusably unaware of his or her cause
of action."43 The discovery rule focuses on the unfairness to the
plaintiff of barring her cause of action for delay when the harm is
inherently unknowable." Fraudulent concealment, in contrast, is
similar in nature to estoppel in that it focuses on the conduct of the
defendant.4"
The discovery rule has its modern genesis in medical malprac-
tice cases. The paradigm case is that of a doctor leaving a sponge
in a patient.46 The discovery rule generally tolls the running of the
statute until the plaintiff knows, or reasonably should know, that she
42 One commentator has noted: "As ... equitable grounds for relief became
available at law through gradual assimilation or statutory merger, and thus became
subject to fixed periods of limitations, the courts adapted their practice to the flexible
equity rule by redefining the cause of action to include discovery as a prerequisite to
'accrual.'" Developments, supra note 11, at 1213.
41 Heriot, supra note 12, at 954.
44 See O'Brien v. Eli Lilly & Co., 668 F.2d 704, 705-06 (3d Cir. 1981) ("Pennsyl-
vania courts have recognized the potential harshness inherent in a rigid application
of the statute and long ago carved out an exception: ignorance of an injury may
delay the running of the statute of limitations."); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Farmer,
865 F. Supp. 1143, 1155 (E.D. Pa. 1994) ("It is the 'inherently unknowable' character
of the injury that is the critical factor that governs the applicability of the discovery
rule." (citing O'Brien, 668 F.2d at 705-06)); Kohler v. Woollen, Brown & Hawkins, 304
N.E.2d 677, 680 (Ill. Ct. App. 1973) ("'It is manifestly unrealistic and unfair to bar a
negligently injured party's cause of action before he has had an opportunity to
discover that it exists.'" (citation omitted)); Developments, supra note 11, at 1203
(suggesting that an exception to a statute of limitations is desirable when there is
harm the plaintiff is unlikely to discover); William M. Schrier, Note, The Guardian or
the Ward: For Whom Does the Statute Toll?, 71 B.U. L. REV. 575, 587 (1991) ("[A]
central consideration in applying tolling provisions is the notion that those who
receive their salutary effects are blameless for their untimeliness.").
"' See Farmer, 865 F. Supp. at 1153 ("The doctrine of fraudulent concealment is
based on estoppel principles.... ."); Palmer v. Borg-Warner Corp., 838 P.2d 1243,
1249 n.9 (Alaska 1992) (noting that "fraudulent concealment precludes a defendant
from relying on the statue [sic] of limitations" (emphasis added)).
"' See, e.g., Ayers v. Morgan, 154 A.2d 788, 794 (Pa. 1959) (holding discovery rule
applicable where doctor left sponge in patient); see also Heriot, supra note 12, at 955
(noting that the "prototypical example" offered by medical malpractice cases led to
the fashioning of discovery rules); Gerald A. McHugh, Jr., The Statute of Limitations
and the Discovery Rule: Variations on a Theme of Fairness, 64 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 197, 197
(1993) (noting that Ayers represented a "textbook case" of the discovery rule).
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has been injured by another party.17 Thus, the conduct of the
defendant as it relates to the plaintiff's discovery is absent from the
equation. As long as the defendant is culpable in the underlying
cause of action, the accrual of the cause of action against her is
postponed until discovery.
The discovery rule has been expanded greatly, mostly by judicial,
as opposed to legislative, action. 4 In many states the discovery
rule now applies to causes of action beyond medical malpractice,
such as other professional malpractice," products liability,5" and
even wrongful death actions.51 Indeed, it appears that in some
states, almost any tort that causes an "inherently unknowable" injury
will be subject to tolling under the discovery rule.
52
Courts maintain a distinction between fraudulent concealment
and the discovery rule because these doctrines serve different
purposes. 5' Fraudulent concealment is designed to estop defen-
4 See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 126 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(noting that a cause of action accrues "when a diligent plaintiff has knowledge of facts
sufficient to put him on notice of an invasion of his legal rights"); Farmer, 865 F.
Supp. at 1155 ("Under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations begins to run
when 'the plaintiff knows, or reasonably should know: (1) that he has been injured,
and (2) that his injury has been caused by another party's conduct.'" (quoting
Cathcart v. Keene Indus. Insulation, 471 A.2d 493, 500 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984)));
Melanie T. Hewell, Comment, Extending the Application ofthe Discovery Rule to Wrongful
Death Actions: Where Will Texas Draw the Line?, 38 BAYLOR L. REV. 151, 152 (1986)
("The discovery rule will toll the commencement of the limitations period until the
plaintiff knows of or 'discovers' the facts and cause of injury for which he seeks
relief.").
4' See Heriot, supra note 12, at 955-63 (arguing that the expansive discovery rules
used in the courts remove the rule-like character given to them by the legislature);
Charles F. Scott, For Whom the Time Tolls-Time of Discovery and the Statute of
Limitations, 64 ILL. BJ. 326, 327 (1976) ("[E]xceptions to various statutes of limita-
tions have been increasinglyjudicial rather than legislative."); see also infra notes 216-
19 and accompanying text.
4 See, e.g., Tom Olesker's Exciting World of Fashion, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. 334 N.E.2d 160, 164 (II1. 1975) (applying discovery rule in cause of action against
a credit reporting agency).
o See, e.g., Louisville Trust Co. v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 580 S.W.2d 497,
500-01 (Ky. 1979) (holding discovery rule applicable to asbestos litigation); Larson v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 399 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Mich. 1986) (same).
"' See, e.g., Frederick v. Calbio Pharmaceuticals, 152 Cal. Rptr. 292, 294 (Ct. App.
1979); White v.Johns-Manville Corp., 693 P.2d 687, 693 (Wash. 1985) (en bane); cf.
Benner v.J.H. Lynch & Sons, Inc., 641 A.2d 332, 336-37 (R.I. 1994) (holding in a
wrongful death action that the discovery rule applies at the time of the accident, not
from discovery of the cause of the accident).
5' 2 See, e.g., Hecht v. Resolution Trust Corp., 635 A.2d 394, 399 (Md. 1994)
("Recognizing the unfairness inherent in charging a plaintiff with slumbering on
rights not reasonably possible to ascertain, this Court adopted what is known as the
discovery rule, which now applies generally in all civil actions." (emphasis added)).
For example, Pennsylvania applies the fraudulent concealment rule in some
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dants from asserting that the cause of action is barred when the
defendant is responsible for the plaintiffs failure to bring suit. The
discovery rule protects plaintiffs from the harsh effects of a
statutory bar when the harm is inherently unknowable. These
distinctions must be kept in mind when ascertaining the nature of
the adverse domination doctrine.54
II. APPLICATION OF THE ADVERSE DOMINATION DOCTRINE
The early common law makes reference to the notion that
domination of a board of directors might toll the statute of
limitations." A specific doctrine and rationale, however, did not
emerge from this period.5" This is not entirely surprising, because
litigation surrounding such claims was relatively infrequent. With
the massive increase in litigation alleging adverse domination under
FIRREA, the actual parameters of the rule are finally being fleshed
out.
Until FIRREA was passed in 1989, use of the doctrine was
uncommon, with few significant cases being decided in the federal
courts and even fewer in the state courts.5 7 When adverse domina-
cases, see Schaffer v. Larzelere, 189 A.2d 267, 269 (Pa. 1963) (noting that fraudulent
concealment applies when "defendant causes the plaintiff to relax his vigilance"), and
the discovery rule in other actions. See Ayers v. Morgan, 154 A.2d 788, 794 (Pa.
1959) (applying the discovery rule in a medical malpractice case).
' See infra part III (determining that adverse domination is a variant of the
discovery rule).
Some courts and commentators distinguish between fraudulent concealment and
the discovery rule by the way each suspends the statute. The fraudulent concealment
doctrine tolls the statute, in that it stops the limitations period from running once it
has begun. The discovery rule postpones accrual, in that it prevents the statute from
running in the first place. See Developments, supra note 11, at 1220-24 (discussing the
distinction between postponement and suspension). These distinctions are important
in practice because they affect the amount of time left to bring suit after the disability
is removed. From a theoretical standpoint, however, the distinction is of limited
importance. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Scaletty, No. 72,230, 1995 WL 111986, at
*5 (Kan. Mar. 17, 1995) ("Whether an accrual or a tolling doctrine is involved,
however, may be a distinction without a difference, since the result is the same.");
Hecht, 635 A.2d at 399 n.11 (noting that for purposes of the adverse domination
doctrine, the distinction makes no practical difference). Thus, it is not explored
further in this Comment.
55See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
5 See Note, supra note 3, at 856-57 (noting that domination was sometimes just
an element of fraudulent concealment, but that at other times it served as a per se
rule that tolled the statute).57 See Scaletty, No. 72,230, 1995 WL 111986, at *4 (noting that most adverse
domination cases were decided in the 1980s and 1990s in the context of failed banks).
One of the most significant cases decided before FIRREA was passed is Federal
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tion began to be litigated on a regular basis, the issues behind the
doctrine were finally illuminated, but they remained unresolved.
After a brief discussion of the structure of FIRREA and the
applicable law, this Part examines the four major issues of conten-
tion: degree of domination, level of culpability, application of the
doctrine to nondirectors, and burden of proof.
A. FIRREA and the Applicable Law
Following the massive failure of the savings and loan industry,
Congress enacted the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act of 198958 (FIRREA) to "restore public confidence
in financial institutions."5 9 Along with numerous provisions to
increase the stability of the industry, a central purpose of the act
was to increase the enforcement powers of federal regulatory
agencies."0 FIRREA gave the FDIC and the newly created RTC the
power to enforce a failed bank's causes of action against its former
officers and directors for their negligence or breaches of duty.
6 1
This power placed the RTC in the capacity of a receiver.
62
Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Bird, 516 F. Supp. 647 (D.P.R. 1981). This case is often
cited for its clear explanation of why the adverse domination doctrine makes sense.
Although the court noted that there was no consensus on the rationale behind the
doctrine, see id. at 650-51, the court held that all "these decisions reflect an implicit
appreciation of the realities of the shareholders' position.... Is it logical to assume
that the directors, in whom the bank has entrusted the discretion to sue, would
authorize the initiation of an action against themselves for their own improprieties?"
Id. at 651; see also supra note 4 (discussing possible reasons the doctrine was not used
earlier by courts).
8 Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C, 15
U.S.C., and 18 U.S.C.).
" Norma Hildenbrand, D&O Liability: Expansion via Regulation, 111 BANKING L.J.
365, 366 (1994).
o See id. at 369 ("A core objective of Congress by enacting FIRREA was to expand
the enforcement powers of the regulatory agencies."); Charles L. O'Brien & Lisa M.
Cavage, FIRREA: Retroactive Application, Due Process Issues, Right-Duty Analysis and the
Statute of Limitations, 108 BANKING L.J. 308, 308-09 (1991) (noting that the Act was
"'expressly designed' to strengthen the enforcement powers of[f]ederal regulators").
61 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1441a(b)(3)(A), 1821(d) (Supp. V 1993); see also Jett Hanna,
Statute of Limitations Issues in FDIC and RTC Claims Against Attorneys Representing
Failed Financial Institutions, 12 REv. LrrIG. 619,620 & n.4 (1993) (noting that FIRREA
gave the FDIC and RTC the power to "try to recover [savings and loan] losses
through litigation against attorneys for failed financial institutions").
6 A "receiver" is "[a] person appointed by a court for the purpose of preserving
property of a debtor pending an action against him, or applying the property in
satisfaction of a creditor's claim, whenever there is danger that, in the absence of
such an appointment, the property will be lost, removed or injured." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1268 (6th ed. 1990).
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In the original act, FIRREA contained a provision for determin-
ing the statute of limitations governing suits by the FDIC or RTC.
63
Often the length of the limitations period was a matter of state law,
because the statute was interpreted as not reviving stale state-law
claims. 64 There was originally a great deal of confusion whether,
under FIRREA, state or federal law should govern the question of
tolling the statute of limitations due to adverse domination. The
Tenth Circuit generally held that the tolling of the statute was a
question of federal common law.65  Beginning with the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, however, this notion has been widely
rejected, and it is now generally held that state law governs the
question whether adverse domination should apply to the tolling of
the statute of limitations.6 6 The application of state law, rather
6' The original statute read:
(A) In general
Notwithstanding any provision of any contract, the applicable statute
of limitations with regard to any action brought by the [FDIC or RTC] as
conservator or receiver shall be-
(i) in the case of any contract claim, the longer of-
(I) the 6-year period beginning on the date the claim accrues; or
(II) the period applicable under State law; and
(ii) in the case of any tort claim, the longer of-
(I) the 3-year period beginning on the date the claim accrues; or
(II) the period applicable under State law.
(B) Determination of the date on which a claim accrues
For purposes of subparagraph (A), the date on which the statute of
limitations begins to run on any claim described in such subparagraph shall
be the later of-
(i) the date of the appointment of the [FDIC or RTC] as conservator or
receiver; or
(ii) the date on which the cause of action accrues.
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No.
101-73, § 212(a), 103 Stat. 183, 232-33, reprinted in Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v.
Dawson, 4 F.3d 1303, 1306 n.2 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2673 (1994).
64 See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Artley, 28 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 1994)
(noting that "[tihe statute 'has been interpreted not to revive stale state-law claims
acquired by the FDIC'" (quoting Dawson, 4 F.3d at 1307)).
" See Farmers & Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Bryan, 902 F.2d 1520, 1523 (10th Cir.
1990) ("[W]e ... adopt the theory as part of the federal common law of this circuit.");
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Scaletty, No. 92-1 101-PFK, 1993 WL 444303, at *3 (D. Kan.
Oct. 29, 1993) (applying the rule espoused in Briyan); Resolution Trust Corp. v.
Thomas, 837 F. Supp. 354, 359 (D. Kan. 1993) (same).
6" See Dawson, 4 F.3d at 1309 ("If the FDIC is to toll the state statute of limitations
prior to its appointment as receiver under the adverse domination doctrine, it must
show the district court that the state law of adverse domination would permit
tolling."); see also Artley, 28 F.3d at 1101 ("Defendants argue that Georgia law applies,
and that Georgia law does not recognize 'adverse domination' in these circumstances.
We agree with defendants."); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Cocke, 7 F.3d 396, 400
1995] 1079
1080 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143: 1065
than federal law, to the question of adverse domination greatly
increased the difficulty the RTC and FDIC faced in pursuing these
claims. Many courts were reluctant to read a rule of adverse
domination into state law unless the doctrine was explicitly
recognized. 67 The decisions barring suit disturbed many members
of Congress, because they decreased the effectiveness of the RTC
and FDIC's pursuit of claims.' Therefore, Congress amended the
statute of limitations in 1994 to prevent the running of the statute
under state law for claims based on intentional misconduct. 9
(4th Cir. 1993) ("Although federal law allows the FDIC ... to bring... claims, the
claims are uniquely state-law causes of action .... Therefore, this case does not
present the situation in which federal statute authorizes and outlines federal activity,
but neglects to furnish a crucial provision that would effectuate the federal activity
more appropriately."), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 53 (1994). Whether the interpretation
of these courts is in fact correct is beyond the scope of this Comment.
67 See, e.g., Artley, 28 F.3d at 1101-02 (refusing to adopt the adverse domination
doctrine because Georgia law does not recognize it); Cocke, 7 F.3d at 402 (applying
the fraudulent concealment doctrine, which requires an affirmative misrepresentation
by the defendant, because Virginia does not expressly recognize the adverse domina-
tion doctrine).
" Senator Metzenbaum was among the most agitated. When Congress set about
to amend FIRREA's statute of limitations, he threatened a filibuster because he
believed that it did not go far enough since it did not extend the statute of limitations
for causes of action based in negligence. Metzenbaum later withdrew his opposition
when the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) agreed to increase its enforcement of
these suits because such suits are not governed by FIRREA's statute of limitations.
See Keith Bradsher, Bill Would Curb Suits on S. & L.'s, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1994, at
D1 (noting that Metzenbaum planned to filibuster the interstate banking bill because
its savings and loan provision would "effectively prevent Federal regulators from
pursuing most negligence cases against the officers, directors, lawyers and accountants
of failed savings and loan institutions"); Albert R. Karr, Bank Measure Clears Senate,
Goes to Clinton, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 1994, at A20 (noting that Metzenbaum
"dropped his opposition after getting assurances ... that the OTS would use its own
considerable powers to pursue" such cases); see also 138 CONG. REC. S15,493 (daily
ed. Sept. 28, 1992) (remarks of Sen. Wirth regarding the extension of the statute of
limitations).
69 See Riegel-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub.
L. No. 103-328, sec. 201(a), § 1821(d)(14), 108 Stat. 2338, 2368 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14)(C)). This act provides, in relevant part:
(C) Revival of expired state causes of action.-
(i) In general.-In the case of any tort claim described in clause (ii) for
which the statute of limitation applicable under State law with respect to
such claim has expired not more than 5 years before the appointment of the
Corporation as conservator or receiver, the Corporation may bring an
action as conservator or receiver on such claim without regard to the
expiration of the statute of limitation applicable under State law.
(ii) Claims described.-A tort claim referred to in clause (i) is a claim arising
from fraud, intentional misconduct resulting in unjust enrichment, or intentional
misconduct resulting in substantial loss to the institution.
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Adverse domination is no longer needed in intentional tort cases
because it is now covered by statute. The amendment resolved the
issue in the context of intentional torts only; the statute of limita-
tions question is left open in the context of negligence claims.
Thus, the question whether state law recognizes the doctrine of
adverse domination remains an important one for many RTC and
FDIC cases under FIRREA.
B. Issues of Contention
1. The Required Level of Domination
Perhaps the most widely discussed variation in the application
of adverse domination-and the most mired in confusion-is the
degree of domination of the board required in order for the
corporation to claim the protection of the doctrine. The source of
the modern adverse domination claim is International Railways of
Central America v. United Fruit Co., 71 in which the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, through the voice of Judge Friendly, first
articulated the boundaries of the rule. The court, faced with an
allegation of domination such that the statute should be tolled, first
noted that prior case law on the question was not particularly clear
in establishing the boundaries of the doctrine. 72 Judge Friendly
then provided what appears to be the first definitive statement on
the level of domination required of the board in order for the
corporation to invoke the doctrine:
One principle emerging with some clarity [from prior cases] is that
a plaintiff who seeks to toll the statute on the basis of domination
of a corporation has the burden of showing "a full, complete and
exclusive control in the directors or officers charged." ... This
principle must mean at least that once the facts giving rise to
possible liability are known, the plaintiff must effectively negate
the possibility that an informed ... director could have induced
the corporation to sue.
7"
Id.
"' Because this Comment determines that negligence is sufficient to invoke the
adverse domination doctrine, see infra notes 191-98 and accompanying text, adverse
domination is still crucial in RTC claims.
7' 373 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 921 (1967).
72 See id. at 413-14.
" Id. at 414 (citations omitted).
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This statement on the required level of culpability became known
as the "complete domination test"7 4 and established the principle
of adverse domination in the federal common law.
7 5
In some ways the complete domination test created more
questions than it answered. Does complete domination require that
every director on the board be culpable as to the underlying
transaction-a numerical complete domination? Or does complete
domination mean that the culpable directors are in such a position
that they can completely dominate the board by their influence and
control-an influential complete domination? The courts are
uncertain, and Judge Friendly himself seemed to recognize the
problem.76 In Farmers & Merchants National Bank v. Bryan, for
example, the court embraced an influential complete domination
approach. The Bryan court was asked to find that adverse domina-
tion did not apply as a matter of law because there were two outside
directors on the board of directors who were not accused of
wrongdoing. 8  The court refused, noting that the question of
domination is one of fact, and that "a plaintiff may also demonstrate
adverse domination by proving that an informed director, though
capable of suing, would not do so."71 Still, under the Bryan
approach, the plaintiff must prove there was no one capable or
willing to sue.8" Other courts, however, tend to favor a numerical
complete domination test.
81
74 See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Dawson, 4 F.3d 1303, 1309 (5th Cir. 1993)
(noting that "complete domination" is one of two competing theories), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 2673 (1994); Heidi H. Mayor et al., Ninth Survey of White Collar Crime:
Financial Institutions Fraud, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 647, 670-71 (1994) (same).
71 See Farmers & Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Bryan, 902 F.2d 1520, 1522 (10th Cir.
1990) ("[O]ther courts have adopted the theory of'adverse domination' as another
equitable vehicle under federal common law for tolling the statute of limitations."
(citing International Rys., 373 F.2d at 414)).
76 See International Rys., 373 F.2d at 414; see also infra note 111 (discussing
International Railways in greater depth).
7 902 F.2d 1520 (10th Cir. 1990).
78 See id. at 1523.
79 
Id.
" See id.
81 Resolution Trust Corp. v. Farmer, 865 F. Supp. 1143 (E.D. Pa. 1994), relied on
the domination of the directors as a group, as opposed to domination by one or two
directors. See id. at 1158. It appears that no court has required the plaintiff to prove
that every director was culpable. Courts have, however, begun to recognize that the
test is a numerical one. See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Bright, 872 F. Supp. 1551,
1563 (N.D. Tex. 1995) (noting that a numerical approach to adverse domination is
proper in the context of a majority test).
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Although the complete domination test is still applied in some
jurisdictions, 82 the trend seems to be toward a "majority test," in
which a plaintiff "must show only that a majority of the board
members were wrongdoers during [the] period the plaintiff seeks to
toll the statute."83 The Fifth Circuit, where a great deal of litigation
involving adverse domination has occurred, adopted the majority
test under Texas law in Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Dawson.
8 4
The court reasoned that "the mere existence of a culpable majority
on the board is so likely to preclude the corporation from filing suit
against the wrongdoers that tolling is thereby justified."85 The
majority test is exclusively a numerical one. 6 Although there is no
consensus among jurisdictions as to whether the majority test or
complete domination test should be applied, the majority test seems
to have the upper hand. 7
2 See, e.g., Farmer, 865 F. Supp. at 1157 ("[T]he plaintiff must negate the
possibility that an informed person or persons could have induced the corporation
to initiate suit.").
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Dawson, 4 F.3d 1303, 1310 (5th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 2673 (1994); see also D. Annette Fields et al., The Statute of
Limitations, in DEFENDING BANK AND THRIFT DIRECTORS AND PROFESSIONALS 143,163
(1994) (noting that most courts use the majority test).
84 4 F.3d 1303 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2673 (1994).
as Id. at 1310.
"See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Bright, 872 F. Supp. 1551, 1563 (N.D. Tex. 1995)
(noting that Dawson can be understood as "support[ing] a numerical interpretation
of the majority test").
"' See, e.g., Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Williams, 599 F. Supp. 1184, 1193-94
(D. Md. 1984) (noting that the "better reasoned" cases apply the majority test); Hecht
v. Resolution Trust Corp., 635 A.2d 394, 402 (Md. 1994) ("Several versions of the
doctrine exist, but the one which appears to be the most common, and which has the
greatest effect on accrual or tolling, is the 'disinterested majority' version .... ");
Hanna, supra note 61, at 654 ("The most common rule has been that the tolling
continues as long as a majority of the board of directors controls the institution.").
For further discussion of the distinction between the two versions, see 3A STEPHEN
M. FLANAGAN & CHARLES R.P. KEATING, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1306.2 (1986) (noting the inconsistencies); Mayor et al.,
supra note 74, at 670-71 (discussing the two different approaches to adverse
domination). It is worth pointing out that at least one court has held that "control
sufficient to warrant the tollingof the statute of limitations may occur where culpable
directors constitute less than a majority of a board of directors." Resolution Trust
Corp. v. Thomas, 837 F. Supp. 354, 359 (D. Kan. 1993). This is yet more evidence
of the inconsistent application of the rules, especially because the Thomas court is in
the Tenth Circuit and should be subject to the holding in Briyan. See supra notes 77-
80 and accompanying text (discussing Biyan).
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2. The Degree of Culpability
The degree of culpability that a plaintiff must allege against
directors also varies among jurisdictions. In many cases a distinc-
tion between gross and ordinary negligence might not be important,
because, under the business judgment rule, directors must be guilty
of gross negligence to be held liable for breach of duty.s8 In the
context of financial institutions, however, the distinction is of
special importance because directors of these institutions tradition-
ally have been held to a higher standard of care.8 9 In addition,
courts will ease the requirement of gross negligence in a variety of
other contexts.9" Thus, when a corporation is able to sue its direc-
tors for negligence, it is important to know whether adverse
domination will apply to toll the statute of limitations.
In the context of FIRREA litigation, some federal jurisdictions,
in applying the appropriate state law, require that the plaintiff allege
some type of affirmative misconduct by the directors to gain the
protection of the adverse domination rule.9 1  Whether gross
" See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) ("[T]he concept of
gross negligence is also the proper standard for determining whether a business
judgment reached by a board of directors was an informed one."); Aronson v. Lewis,
473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) ("[U]nder the businessjudgment rule director liability
is predicated upon concepts of gross negligence."); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d
776, 779-80 (Ill. Ct. App. 1968) (explaining that a court of equity cannot interfere
with the board of directors' control over a corporation unless the directors have acted
fraudulently or breached a duty of good faith).
" See Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 678 (1940) ("Undoubtedly, a director of
a bank is held to stricter accountability than the director of an ordinary business
corporation."); ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 755-
58 (5th ed. 1994) (discussing the higher standard of care for bank directors);
Hildenbrand, supra note 59, at 379 ("The common law has always exacted a higher
standard on directors and officers of financial institutions."); see also Billman v. State
of Maryland Deposit Ins. Fund Corp., 593 A.2d 684, 698 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.) (noting
that the standard of care of banking officers is based on standards of the banking
industry), cert. denied, 599 A.2d 447 (Md. 1991). But see Selheimer v. Manganese
Corp. of Am., 224 A.2d 634, 642-43 (Pa. 1966) (holding that a recently enacted
statute removed any higher standard of care that might be owed by officers or
directors of a banking institution).
o See, e.g., Louisiana World Exposition v. Federal Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 1147, 1151
(5th Cir. 1989) (noting that nonprofit directors were typically held to a higher
standard of care); cf. 1 WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORP-
ORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 3-4, at 101 (5th ed. 1993) (noting that the "degree
of care required depends upon the circumstances under which the director acted").
91 See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Dawson, 4 F.3d 1303, 1312 (5th Cir. 1993) ("[T]he
adverse domination theory is inappropriate when the majority of the board is merely
negligent."), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2673 (1994); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Farmer,
865 F. Supp. 1143, 1157 (E.D. Pa. 1994) ("[P]laintiff must show that [the dominators]
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negligence is necessary to satisfy this heightened culpability test is
not clear.92 Other courts allow adverse domination to be used
against directors even for simple negligence.
93
3. Application of the Adverse Domination Doctrine to Toll
the Statute on a Corporation's Cause of Action
Against Third Parties
Jurisdictions also disagree on whether a corporation may argue
that the adverse domination of its board of directors should toll the
statute of limitations for the corporation's causes of action against
nondirectors. For example, a corporation may seek to toll the
statute of limitations on a malpractice claim against its attorneys.94
Usually, such cases involve a third party who in some way benefited
from the culpable activity of the dominating directors. 5 A few
courts have extended the application of the doctrine to third
parties.9 6  Other courts, most notably the Fifth Circuit in its
were active participants in true wrongdoing, that is, their conduct was more culpable
than mere negligence.").
"I Compare Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Henderson, 849 F. Supp. 495, 498 (E.D.
Tex. 1994) (finding that gross negligence is sufficient to invoke the application of
adverse domination) with Resolution Trust Corp. v. Acton, 844 F. Supp. 307, 317
(N.D. Tex. 1994) (finding that gross negligence is not sufficient to invoke the
application of adverse domination), aff'd, No. 94-10375, 1995 WL 144124 (5th Cir.
April 4, 1995). The affirmance ofActon by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals shortly
before the publication of this Comment would seem to resolve this issue within the
Fifth Circuit. See also Resolution Trust Corp. v. Bright, 872 F. Supp. 1551, 1563 (N.D.
Tex. 1995) (holding that actionable fraud, rather than constructive fraud, is required
to invoke the doctrine).
9 See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. O'Bear, Overholser, Smith & Huffer, 840 F.
Supp. 1270, 1284 (N.D. Ind. 1993) (comparing adverse domination to the discovery
rule and holding that "a corporate 'plaintiff' has not discovered alleged negligence
until that negligence is discovered by those who can be expected to act to redress the
entity's interest" (emphasis added)); see also infra part IV.B (noting that the required
level of culpability should be negligence and citing cases which have so held).
' See, e.g., O'Bear, 840 F. Supp. at 1284-85 (applying the adverse domination
doctrine in a case in which the RTC brought an action against counsel of a failed
institution); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Gardner, 798 F. Supp. 790, 794-96 (D.D.C.
1992) (granting RTC's motion to toll the statute of limitations in a suit to recover
improper payments made by a failed savings and loan to its attorney).
I In Gardner, the attorney was accused of receiving improper payments from the
corporation. See Gardner, 798 F. Supp. at 791-92; see also Mayor et al., supra note 74,
at 672 ("Directors and officers, who themselves are guilty of wrongdoing, would
certainly not bring an action against a third party who benefited from the same
fraudulent activity, out of fear that their own culpable conduct might be discov-
ered.").
I See, e.g., Bornstein v. Poulos, 793 F.2d 444, 448 (1st Cir. 1986) (concluding that
the lower court's reasoning with regard to tolling the statute of limitations extended
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application of Texas law, have balked at this expansive reading of
the doctrine.9 7 The resolution of the third-party issue may have the
most far-reaching effects because it could expand the use of adverse
domination to everyone who has any contact with a corporation.
4. The Burden of Proof
As the use of adverse domination increases, more intricate
problems concerning the practical functioning of the doctrine are
being discussed. Generally, courts place the burden of proving
adverse domination on the plaintiff." In Hecht v. Resolution Trust
Corp.,99 however, the Maryland Court of Appeals adopted what it
termed "the disinterested majority" test.1"' Under this rationale,
the burden of production falls on the plaintiff to show that a
majority of the board is culpable.' Once this has been shown,
the burden shifts to the defendant, who presumably has better
access to information, 0 2 to prove that someone on the board was
willing and able to bring suit.' Contrary to the views of
to the attorney, who also had a fiduciary duty to the corporation); Mosesian v. Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 727 F.2d 873, 879 (9th Cir.) (reaching a similar conclusion
in an action against a certified public accountant), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 932 (1984);
O'Bear, 840 F. Supp. at 1284 ("The doctrine has been extended to apply even where
the defendant does not dominate, or even sit on, the relevant entity's board.");
Gardner, 798 F. Supp. at 795 ("[D]efendant attempts to unduly restrict the reach of
the adverse domination doctrine. Contrary to defendant's contention, the doctrine
has been applied in cases involving defendants who were neither officers nor directors
of the corporation.").
9 See, e.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Shrader & York, 991 F.2d 216, 227 (5th
Cir. 1993) (noting that the doctrine does not apply to third parties under Texas law),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2704 (1994).
" See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Farmer, 865 F. Supp. 1143, 1157 (E.D. Pa.
1994) (placing the burden on the plaintiff to prove that an informed person could not
have induced the corporation to sue).
9 635 A.2d 394 (Md. 1994).
Id. at 401-02 (stating that the disinterested majority test "provides that claims
by a corporation do not accrue and/or limitations do not run against any of the
culpable officers and directors until there exists a disinterested majority of
nonculpable directors").
101 See id. at 407-08 (noting that the doctrine carries a presumption in favor of
plaintiffs that a corporation will not sue as long as a majority of the board is culpa-
ble).
102 See id. (noting that directors control resources and information).
o See id. at 407 (noting that the presumption "could be rebutted ... if [the
defendants] could show that the.., disinterested directors could have brought suit
against them"); see also Resolution Trust Corp. v. Scaletty, No. 72,230, 1995 WL
111986, at *3 (Kan. Mar. 17, 1995) ("[T]he plaintiff enjoys a presumption that the
course [sic] of action does not accrue so long as the culpable directors remain in the
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some,"°4 the allocation of the burden of proof does not turn on
whether adverse domination is seen as a tolling or an accrual
doctrine.'0 5 The resolution of the burden of proof issue is of key
importance because courts need to know how to apply the adverse
domination doctrine.
* * *
Courts disagree about the resolution of the boundaries of
adverse domination because they are unsure of the theoretical
underpinnings of the doctrine.0 6 The resolution of these issues
necessarily depends on whether the doctrine is based on principles
akin to fraudulent concealment theory (estoppel principles based on
the conduct of the defendant) or on principles akin to the discovery
rule (principles based on fairness to the plaintiff in not barring
claims that are inherently unknowable). The next Part of this
Comment will resolve these inconsistencies by determining the
theory behind the adverse domination doctrine.
III. THE PROPER THEORETICAL BASIS OF THE ADVERSE
DOMINATION DOCTRINE: THE DISCOVERY RULE
Given the confused state of the law surrounding the adverse
domination doctrine, it is important to discern the theoretically
correct application of the doctrine. Thus, as state supreme courts
adopt the doctrine, they can do so in a consistent manner. This
majority.").
104 See Fields, supra note 83, at 162-63 (arguing that whether adverse domination
is looked at as a tolling doctrine or an accrual doctrine will change the allocation of
the burden of proof).
10 The courts in both Hecht v. Resolution Trust Corp., 635 A.2d 394 (Md. 1994),
and Resolution Trust Corp. v. Farmer, 865 F. Supp. 1143 (E.D. Pa. 1994), found
adverse domination to be a variant of the discovery rule, an accrual doctrine. See
infra notes 128-33 and accompanying text. The Hecht court placed the burden of
proof on the defendant, see supra note 101, whereas the Farmer court placed the
burden on the plaintiff. See supra note 98.
1" See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Bird, 516 F. Supp. 647, 651 (D.P.R. 1981).
The Bird court noted that the cases involving adverse domination
rely on various theories, e.g., that control perse precludes the possibility of
filing suit, that control puts the corporation in the position of a cestui of a
trust and unable to make an adverse claim, or that control relates to a
concealment or nondisclosure, fraudulent or otherwise, of the existence of
grounds for a cause of action.
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Part will explore the theoretical basis of the adverse domination
doctrine. First, the doctrine will be analyzed under the rubric of the
fraudulent concealment rule. Although adverse domination shares
certain similar aspects with fraudulent concealment, this is not the
most satisfactory mode of analysis. An analysis of adverse domina-
tion under the rubric of the discovery rule will illustrate that it is
the inherently unknowable nature of the harm that is essential to
adverse domination. Thus, the discovery rule is the better model by
which to analyze the adverse domination doctrine.
A. Adverse Domination as Fraudulent Concealment
Fraudulent concealment tolls the statute of limitations based on
principles related to the conduct of the defendant-the defendant
must have in some way affirmatively concealed from the plaintiff
that a cause of action exists. 107 In the case of a corporation, the
question is complicated by the fact that the corporation is a fictional
entity that can act only through its directors.' 5 With the excep-
tion of shareholder derivative suits, 109 directors are the only ones
who can bring suit for the corporation.' Therefore, if the
107See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
o See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Farmer, 865 F. Supp. 1143, 1151 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
(noting that a corporation can act only through its directors); In re Maxwell
Newspapers, Inc., 164 B.R. 858, 866 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("In the case of a
corporation, which can act only through its agents, the rule is that the actions of
corporate directors and officers are attributable to the corporate entity."); MODEL
BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 8.01(b) (1984 & Supp. 1991) ("All corporate powers shall be
exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of the corporation
managed under the direction of, its board of directors .... ."); 1 KNEPPER & BAILEY,
supra note 90, § 1-2, at 4 ("Most state corporation statutes provide that the business
and affairs of a corporation shall be managed by or under the direction of its board
of directors.").
1 See infra part III.C (resolving the problem of derivative suits in the discovery
rule context).
"' The general rule is that the board of directors is the party charged with
bringing suit for the corporation, because this act involves the business operations of
the board. See Bird, 516 F. Supp. at 651 (stating that the board of directors is the
group in which the corporation "entrusted the discretion to sue"); Hecht v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 635 A.2d 394, 398 (Md. 1994) ("Maryland law provides that
directors of a corporation exercise all powers of the corporation... [including the
power to sue]."); MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (providing that the board
shall manage the business of the corporation). A shareholder may also bring an
action against the board on behalf of the corporation in the form of a derivative suit.
The difficulty with pursuing such an action due to heightened pleading requirements,
however, means that the possibility of shareholder derivative actions does not destroy
the discovery rule as a theoretically sound basis for the adverse domination doctrine.
See infra part III.C.
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dominating directors are attempting to conceal the corporation's
cause of action, it must be an attempt to conceal it from the
nonculpable directors of the corporation. Thus, if adverse domina-
tion is analyzed through the lens of fraudulent concealment,
domination of the corporation is characterized as influential
complete domination: the dominating directors are using their
influence over the board to keep it from bringing suit against
them.
11
Adverse domination certainly has some aspects that liken it to
fraudulent concealment. Whenever a court uses language like
"where culpable directors and officers control a corporation, they
are unlikely to initiate actions or investigations for fear that such
actions will reveal their own wrongdoing," that court is at least
partially concerned with the conduct of the defendant in preventing
a suit from being brought, rather than with the unfairness to the
plaintiff."'
Although adverse domination does have some elements similar
to fraudulent concealment, there are several factors that make
fraudulent concealment an unsatisfactory mode of analysis. First,
' In International Rys. of Cent. Am. v. United Fruit Co., 373 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 387 U.S. 921 (1967), the court noted that prior decisions were unable to
clarify whether the adverse domination doctrine was being invoked "as affecting the
ability to sue [or] ... as effecting concealment." Id. at 414. But the court seemed
to indicate that the cases generally require at least a majority of culpable directors to
toll the statute of limitations under the doctrine, see id., which indicates that the court
was actually basing its outcome on numerical complete domination. Other courts
have not yet distinguished carefully between whether adverse domination is being
applied because of the influence the directors have used over the other directors or
because of the power gained by majority control. At least some courts have implied
in their language, however, that influence is a factor. See Resolution Trust Corp. v.
Thomas, 837 F. Supp. 354, 359 (D. Kan. 1993) (finding that adverse domination was
possible with less than a majority of culpable directors when the one culpable director
was the sole shareholder, suggesting that his influence was the significant issue). In
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Gardner, 798 F. Supp. 790 (D.D.C. 1992), the court applied
adverse domination against a third party who was involved with the director's
wrongdoing. See id. at 795. This outcome suggests that even a nondirector can
exercise influential domination over a corporation. See Hanna, supra note 61, at 653
("A majority of the cases ... have accepted that attorneys can exercise domination
of an institution .... ").
1' Gardner, 798 F. Supp. at 795; see also Resolution Trust Corp. v. O'Bear,
Overholser, Smith & Huffer, 840 F. Supp. 1270, 1284 (N.D. Ind. 1993) ("The
rationale behind the adverse domination doctrine is premised upon the principle that
officers and directors who have harmed the entity cannot be expected to take legal
action against themselves." (citation omitted)); Hanna, supra note 61, at 653-54
(noting that adverse domination is justified because officers are unlikely to sue
themselves); Leslie, supra note 11, at 1595 (same).
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if adverse domination is treated as having its roots in the influence
effect, the corporation would need to prove active concealment by
the dominating directors."' If the corporation can prove active
concealment, however, it already has a strong case for simply
applying the traditional fraudulent concealment rule. In other
words, the fact that the dominating directors are using their
influence to inhibit suit means that they are actively using their
influence to force the other directors not to sue and are thus
engaged in fraudulent concealment.1n 4 Thus, a theory of adverse
domination would really serve no purpose-it would, in fact, be
identical to fraudulent concealment. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit
seems to have accepted this interpretation of the adverse domina-
tion doctrine."
5
One could argue that a claim of adverse domination could serve
the purpose of creating a presumption that the cause of action was
fraudulently concealed, thereby placing the burden on the defen-
dant to prove that there was no fraudulent concealment. To a
certain extent this scheme is very plausible. It seems reasonable to
create a rebuttable presumption that someone committing some
affirmative misconduct, such as stealing from the corporation,
would conceal her conduct from the other directors. In cases
involving fraud committed by the directors, however, the presump-
tion probably would not be that important. Many jurisdictions, as
well as federal common law, do not require additional fraudulent
concealment when the underlying cause of action is fraud, granting
tolling not only for "fraudulent concealment" but also for "undiscov-
ered fraud." 6 Therefore, proving fraudulent concealment in
n' See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Cocke, 7 F.3d 396, 402 (4th Cir. 1993)
(holding that under Virginia's fraudulent concealment law "a statute of limitations is
tolled until a person intentionally misled by a putative defendant could reasonably
discover the wrongdoing" (emphasis added)), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 53 (1994); supra
notes 34-45 and accompanying text (noting that fraudulent concealment usually
requires active concealment).
114 Even if the directors are not actively concealing, there is recent authority
suggesting that active concealment is not required in cases involving a fiduciary duty.
See supra note 37.
"' See Cocke, 7 F.3d at 402 (relating the adverse domination doctrine to fraudulent
concealment under a Virginia statute); see also Resolution Trust Corp. v. Walde, 856
F. Supp. 281, 286 (E.D. Va. 1994) (comparing adverse domination to fraudulent
concealment); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Everhart, 837 F. Supp. 155, 158 (E.D. Va.
1993) (same), aff'd, 37 F.3d 151 (4th Cir. 1994).
H6 See Dawson, supra note 37, at 880; Leslie, supra note 11, at 1593-94; Note, supra
note 3, at 854.
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fraud cases would not require affirmative misrepresentation, and
the rebuttable presumption would not be needed.
After intentional torts are removed by the undiscovered fraud
rule, the rebuttable presumption would remain for cases in which
there is no scienter. Creating a presumption of concealment does
not seem to make a lot of sense in cases involving negligence or
gross negligence. Although a board of directors may choose not to
pursue a negligence claim against themselves, this does not
necessarily mean they are fraudulently concealing the cause of
action from the corporation or from each other. Indeed, given the
lack of scienter in these cases, it is perfectly reasonable to believe
that the director may feel she is innocent and that pursuit of the
action would not be in the best interests of the corporation.
1 7
Another problem with analyzing adverse domination along the
lines of fraudulent concealment is that the dominating directors do
not need to conceal the corporation's cause of action. Almost all
adverse domination cases require the board to be composed of at
least a majority of culpable directors.' If the dominating direc-
tors completely dominate the board, there are no independent
directors from whom to conceal the cause of action. Even if the
dominating directors control only a majority of the board, the board
of directors must act through majority rule, and the directors do not
need to conceal their actions from the other directors if they have
a majority that will vote against bringing suit." 9 The only parties
11 Delaware case law, by applying the business judgment rule'to the decision not
to bring a lawsuit, creates a presumption that directors act in good faith, even when
they are dominated. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 818 (Del. 1984) (holding
that demand is not excused simply because the board would have to sue itself; facts
must be alleged with particularity in order to overcome the business judgment rule);
Paul H. Dawes & Mary E. Kostel, The Treatment of the Demand Requirement and the Use
of the Special Litigation Committee in Delaware Law and in the American Law Institute's
"Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations," in SECURITIES
LITIGATION 1992, at 383, 389 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series
No. 4-444, 1992) (noting the "great deference accorded" to a board's decision not to
sue under Delaware law).
11 See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text (asserting that it is generally
accepted that, in order to invoke the adverse domination rule, the board must be
composed of at least a majority of culpable directors).
119 If one of the members of the board is able to induce the shareholders to bring
a derivative suit, however, there may be reason for the dominating directors to
conceal their cause of action. This problem is accounted for by only applying adverse
domination when the board is completely dominated. See infra notes 184-89 and
accompanying text. Therefore, whether a presumption of fraudulent concealment
maybe appropriate in negligence cases in which the dominating directors constitute
only a majority of the board is beyond the scope of this Comment because such a
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left from whom to conceal the cause of action would be the
shareholders. As discussed below, however, the difficulties in
bringing a shareholder derivative suit make it largely unnecessary to
make affirmative efforts to conceal the cause of action from
shareholders.
120
B. Adverse Domination Is More Similar
to the Discovery Rule
Although adverse domination shares some aspects with
fraudulent concealment, it makes more sense to examine the
doctrine as a variant of the discovery rule. This section first
examines how the theory supporting the discovery rule is very
similar to the theory supporting the doctrine of adverse domination.
It then discusses recent decisions that reach the conclusion that
adverse domination is similar to the discovery rule.
It is a well-settled principle of agency law that when an agent is
acting adversely to the interests of the principal, any knowledge
gained by that agent will not be imputed to the principal. 121 In the
corporate context, the corporation is the principal, and the board
of directors as a whole is the agent. 122 Therefore, when the board
is controlled by a majority of wrongdoers acting adversely to the
corporation,12 3 not only is the cause of action difficult to discover,
situation would not be considered adverse domination.
121 See infra part III.C (outlining the procedural requirements of a shareholder
derivative suit).
121 See In re Maxwell Newspapers, Inc., 164 B.R. 858, 865-68 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1994); Anchor Equities, Ltd. v. Joya, 773 P.2d 1022, 1025 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989);
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Scaletty, No. 72,230, 1995 WL 111986, at *6 (Kan. Mar. 17,
1995); Clark v. Milam, 452 S.E.2d 714,718 (W. Va. 1994); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 282 (1958).
12 Because a director cannot act alone, but only through the board of directors
as a whole, it is the board as a whole, and not the individual director, that is the agent
of the corporation. See infra note 158 and accompanying text (explaining that a
corporation can usually only act through its board of directors).
123 It should be noted that if the board of directors is accused of breaching its duty
to the corporation, it necessarily is accused of acting adversely to the principal's
interests. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Farmer, 865 F. Supp. 1143, 1155-56 (E.D. Pa.
1994) (stating that the knowledge of an agent acting adversely to its principal will not
be imputed to the principal in adverse domination situations); Hecht v. Resolution
Trust Corp., 635 A.2d 394, 405 (Md. 1994) (same); see also infra note 198 (asserting
that negligence meets the adverse interest requirement in the adverse domination
context). Indeed, this is the basis of any suit against the directors of a corporation.
See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); see also 1 KNEPPER &
BAILEY, supra note 90, § 1-4, at 9.
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it is legally impossible for the corporation to gain the knowledge
necessary for it to discover its cause of action.
124
This "inherently unknowable" aspect of the breach of duty by
the board unquestionably ties adverse domination to the theoretical
underpinnings of the discovery rule.1 25 Although many courts
have applied adverse domination with little analysis as to why they
were accepting it,12 several recent cases have insightfully observed
that the doctrine is akin to the discovery rule because adverse
domination is also based on the principle of "inherently unknowable
harm."
27
In Resolution Trust Corp. v. Farmer,121 Judge Rendell of the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania considered whether adverse
domination is applicable under Pennsylvania law. Judge Rendell
concluded that "the adverse domination doctrine [is] in accord with
the essence of Pennsylvania's discovery rule."12 She held:
It is the "'inherently unknowable'" character of the injury that is
the critical factor that governs the applicability of the discovery
rule .... A corporate plaintiff does not have "knowledge" of an
124 The fictional nature of the corporate entity makes this concept more difficult
to understand, especially because the concept is driven not by tangible logic of the
ability of a person to discover, but by principles of agency law. See Resolution Trust
Corp. v. O'Bear, Overholser, Smith & Huffer, 840 F. Supp. 1270, 1284 (N.D. Ind.
1993) ("As a corporate entity, [plaintiff] can only 'discover' an injury to itself, and act
to redress that injury, to the extent that those individuals who control it know of the
injury and are willing to act on that knowledge."); Beal v. Smith, 189 P. 341,345 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1920) (noting that where a corporation and its board were "wholly under the
domination of those who committed the original fraud, the corporation is deemed
to be in the same position as an incompetent person or a minor without legal capacity
either to know or to act in relation to the fraud so committed"); Clark, 452 S.E.2d at
719 ("[A]s a matter of law, [plaintiff] cannot be deemed to have known of its claims
against the 0 & D Defendants arising out of the acts they allegedly committed
adverse to [the corporation's] interests.").
"'5 See supra notes 43-52 and accompanying text (noting that the discovery rule is
driven by the unfairness of charging a plaintiff with an inherently unknowable injury).
2' See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Gardner, 798 F. Supp. 790, 794-95 (D.D.C.
1992) (relying heavily on the application of the doctrine by other federal courts).
127 See, e.g., Farmer, 865 F. Supp. at 1155; Hecht, 635 A.2d at 400; Clark, 452 S.E.2d
at 717-18. But see, e.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Cocke, 7 F.3d 396, 402 (4th Cir.
1993) (stating that adverse domination under Virginia law is fraudulent concealment),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 53 (1994); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Walde, 856 F. Supp. 281,
286 (E.D. Va. 1994) (noting that adverse domination "tolling theory is not recognized
in Virginia"); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Everhart, 837 F. Supp. 155, 158 (E.D. Va.
1993) (finding that, in Virginia, the statute of limitations is not tolled unless the
directors concede to their wrongdoing).
121 865 F. Supp. 1143 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
19 Id. at 1157.
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injury to itself until those individuals who control it know of the
injury and are willing to act on that knowledge. This idea is
consistent with Pennsylvania agency law, which provides that
knowledge of an agent whose interests are adverse to the principal
cannot be imputed to the principal.'
In Hecht v. Resolution Trust Corp.,' 3 ' the Maryland Court of
Appeals reached a similar conclusion regarding the origins of the
adverse domination doctrine. The court first traced the history of
the application of the discovery rule in Maryland, noting that the
doctrine is based on "the unfairness inherent in charging a plaintiff
with slumbering on rights not reasonably possible to ascertain."
3 2
The court then accepted adverse domination, based on the difficulty
the corporation has in obtaining knowledge of its cause of action:
In an adverse domination situation the agent cannot reasonably be
expected to act upon or communicate knowledge of his own
wrongdoing to the corporation. Therefore, in most cases,
corporate board members and officers control the corporation and
constitute an insuperable barrier to a corporation's ability to
acquire knowledge and resources necessary to bring suit against
the directors and officers.... The discovery rule provides that
accrual takes place only when a plaintiff has notice of the existence
of a cause of action. The doctrine of adverse domination
presumes that actual notice will not be available until the corpo-
rate plaintiff is no longer in control of the erring directors.
133
In Clark v. Milam,'3 4 the West Virginia Supreme Court, speak-
ing through the voice of Justice Neely, reached a conclusion similar
to that of the Hecht and Farmer courts. The court held that "a
corporate plaintiff cannot 'discover' injuries to the corporation
caused by those who control the corporation."" 5 Using the same
agency principals as the Hecht and Farmer courts, the Clark court
held that adverse domination applied as a matter of law. 136 The
Supreme Court of Kansas followed suit, adopting the adverse
domination rule under a tort limitation statute providing that a
cause of action does not accrue until discovery.'3 7  The court
I" Id. at 1155-56 (citation omitted).
"3 635 A.2d 394 (Md. 1994).
"32 Id. at 399.
"'3 Id. at 405.
1-4 452 S.E.2d 714 (W. Va. 1994)
135 Id. at 718.
11 See id. at 718-19.
"' See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Scaletty, No. 72,230, 1995 WL 111986, at *6
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noted that a corporation can act only through its agents, rendering
it legally impossible for the corporation to discover its cause of
action as long as those directors are in control of the corporation
and acting adversely to it."'
These cases make it clear that the inherently unknowable nature
of the injury drives the doctrine of adverse domination. As such, it
is more appropriate to analyze these claims under the rubric of the
discovery rule.
39
C. Solving the Problem of Derivative Actions
The possibility of a derivative suit being brought by a sharehold-
er 140 weakens the argument for basing adverse domination on the
discovery rule. Although the corporation cannot discover its cause
of action because it can acquire information only through its
directors, 4 1 the same constraint does not necessarily apply to an
independent shareholder's ability to discover a cause of action. A
shareholder is a human being, capable of using her five senses to
gain information by means other than through the board of
directors. Therefore, it would seem that the statute of limitations
should not be tolled when a shareholder should have discovered the
cause of action.
Unfortunately, many courts have glossed over this problem
without discussing why derivative actions do not bar the application
of the adverse domination doctrine.142 Therefore, it is necessary
(Kan. Mar. 17, 1995).
138 See id. (discussing the agency principles and the difficulties involved when a
corporation tries to discover its causes of action).
"' See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Smith, 872 F. Supp. 805,813 (D. Or. 1995) ("This
court agrees with the Supreme Court of the state of Maryland that the doctrine of
adverse domination is a corollary of the discovery rule and determines the accrual of
a cause of action ... ."); Resolution Trust Corp. v. O'Bear, Overholser, Smith &
Huffer, 840 F. Supp. 1270, 1284 (N.D. Ind. 1993) (relating adverse domination almost
exactly to the discovery rule, and holding that "a corporate 'plaintiff' has not discov-
ered alleged negligence until that negligence is discovered by those who can be
expected to act to redress the entity's interest"). But see Resolution Trust Corp. v.
Bright, 872 F. Supp. 1551, 1568 (N.D. Tex. 1995) (confusing the application of the
discovery rule by searching for discovery by the board, rather than by the corporation
as an entity); id. at 1565-71 (attempting to analyze the statute of limitations problems
under adverse domination, the discovery rule, and fraudulent concealment).
140 A derivative action is an action brought by a shareholder to enforce the rights
of the corporation. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 443-44 (6th ed. 1990); 2 KNEPPER
& BAILEY, supra note 90, § 18-1(c), at 112-13 (discussing derivative suits generally).
14 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
142 Some cases have discussed derivative suits but have not analyzed the problem
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to explain briefly why derivative actions do not pose a problem for
basing the adverse domination theory on the discovery rule. This
explanation is based on two factors: the reality of the business
judgment rule and the rules of civil procedure.
A shareholder who wishes to bring a suit on the corporation's
behalf must almost always first make a demand upon the corporate
board of directors to sue."" If the board of directors is asked to
bring suit and refuses, that decision is subject to the business
judgment rule and is voidable only if made in bad faith. 44 Al-
though the shareholder can allege that the board's decision was not
in good faith because it was adversely dominated, most courts will
require that this allegation be pled with specificity.1 45
in any depth. See International Rys. of Cent. Am. v. United Fruit Co., 373 F.2d 408,
412 (2d Cir.) (recognizing that "once the facts giving rise to the action have become
known to independent directors.., they can bring a derivative action"), cert. denied,
387 U.S. 921 (1967); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Brown, No. CIV.A.H-91-2073,1992
WL 677891, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 3, 1992) (applying the adverse domination doctrine
despite the defendants' contention that it should not apply because the majority
shareholder could have brought a derivative suit); Hecht v. Resolution Trust Corp.,
635 A.2d 394, 407-08 (Md. 1994) (briefly discussing the possibility of a derivative
action).
14 See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784 (Del. 1981) (indicating
circumstances when the demand requirement is excused); Note, Discoveiy in Federal
Demand-Refused Derivative Litigation, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1025, 1025-26 (1992)
("Because of the various costs associated with derivative actions, all states require
shareholders first to 'demand' action from the corporation's directors."); cf. Aronson
v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984) (tightening the demand requirement
considerably).
'" See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (stating that the businessjudgment rule "is a pre-
sumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on
an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in
the best interests of the company"); see also Zapata, 430 A.2d at 784 ("[A] board
decision to cause a derivative suit to be dismissed as detrimental to the company,
after demand has been made and refused, will be respected unless it was wrongful.");
Dawes & Kostel, supra note 117, at 393 (explaining that to plead wrongful rejection
the plaintiff must show that either the directors were interested or the board was
grossly negligent); Note, supra note 143, at 1026 ("Many states allow corporations to
terminate 'demand-refused' derivative suits unless shareholders can provide some
evidence that the corporate directors wrongfully refused the shareholders' demand.");
cf. Joel Seligman, The Disinterested Person: An Alternative Approach to Shareholder
Derivative Litigation, 55 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 357, 360-61 (1992) (discussing the
ability of a special litigation committee to dismiss an action).
145 See Dawes & Kostel, supra note 117, at 393 ("A successful showing of
interestedness, while less rare, requires plaintiff to demonstrate with particular facts
that the director(s) in question had a special pecuniary interest in the transaction.");
Note, supra note 143, at 1028 ("Some federal courts have held that rule 23.1 requires
plaintiffs to demonstrate wrongful refusal solely through the pleadings .... ").
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Another option for the shareholder is to attempt to avoid the
demand requirement altogether by claiming that demand would be
futile. The shareholder must plead with specificity, however, in
accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1 or the
equivalent state rule, why the board is not independent and capable
of making a fair decision about whether suit should be brought. 46
The Delaware Supreme Court, in Aronson v. Lewis, 47 has enforced
this requirement even when the board was dominated by a majority
of directors:
[I]n the demand context even proof of majority ownership of a
company does not strip the directors of the presumptions of
independence, and that their acts have been taken in good faith
and in the best interests of the corporation. There must be
coupled with the allegation of control such facts as would
demonstrate that through personal or other relationships the
directors are beholden to the controlling person....
We conclude that in the demand-futile context a plaintiff
charging domination and control of one or more directors must
allege particularized facts manifesting a "direction of corporate
146 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1 provides, in relevant part:
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members
to enforce a right of a corporation or of an unincorporated association, the
corporation or association having failed to enforce a right which may
properly be asserted by it, the complaint shall be verified and shall allege
... with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the
action the plaintiff desires from the directors or comparable authority and,
if necessary, from the shareholders or members, and the reasons for the
plaintiff's failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort.
FED R. Civ. P. 23.1. Delaware's derivative rule is essentially the same. See DEL. CH.
CT. R. 23.1.
The Delaware Supreme Court has held that "the entire question of demand
futility is inextricably bound to issues of businessjudgment and the standards of that
doctrine's applicability." Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. Concerned that after Zapata
shareholders were filing too many derivative suits alleging demand futility, the court
also held:
The Court of Chancery in the exercise of its sound discretion must be
satisfied that a plaintiff has alleged facts with particularity which, taken as
true, support a reasonable doubt that the challenged transaction was the
product of a valid exercise of business judgment. Only in that context is
demand excused.
Id. at 815; see also Note, supra note 143, at 1027 ("Federal courts have generally
agreed that rule 23.1 requires plaintiffs who claim demandfutility to plead specific
facts to support their claim." (footnote omitted)).
147 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
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conduct in such a way as to comport with the wishes or interests
of the corporation (or persons) doing the controlling.""
The Aronson court went on to hold that even if all of the directors
are named in the suit and therefore subject to potential liability,
facts must be alleged with particularity such that Rule 23.1 is not
abrogated and managerial powers of directors are not weak-
ened.1
49
Therefore, the shareholder must be able to plead with specificity
to either attack a board's decision not to sue or circumvent the
demand requirement. Unfortunately, such pleadings must be
prepared without the benefit of discovery. 5 ° Without discovery,
making the required showing of specificity to overcome the business
judgment rule or the demand-excused requirement is an almost
insurmountable barrier to a shareholder derivative suit.15 1 This
result is especially likely when the board is completely dominated by
the alleged wrongdoers, because they are unlikely to be helpful in
providing the shareholders with information.'5 2
148 Id. at 815-16 (citations omitted).
14' See id. at 818.
" See Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 209 (Del. 1991) (not allowing discovery in
a demand-refused case). See generally Note, supra note 143 (arguing that discovery
should be allowed before derivative suits are dismissed on the pleadings because the
plaintiff otherwise has no meaningful possibility of winning even a meritorious suit).
'5' See Note, supra note 143, at 1028-29. The difficulty for shareholders is
apparent:
[S]ome ... courts have forced shareholders to present evidence of a
wrongful refusal without the benefit of discovery, even though it is difficult
for shareholders who have no information about a corporation's investiga-
tory procedures to create a reasonable doubt that a corporation adequately
investigated a demand. Such decisions create a virtually insurmountable
obstacle for shareholders who have no knowledge of the internal corporate
decisionmaking process and will effectively bar many derivative suits
regardless of their merit.
Id. (citations omitted).
1- See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Brown, No.CIV.A.H-91-2073, 1992 WL
677891, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 3, 1992) ("While the alleged wrongdoers remain in
control 'they can dominate the non-culpable directors and control the most likely
sources of information and funding necessary to pursue the rights of the associa-
tion.'" (citation omitted)).
In fact, the refusal to give information may not be accompanied by any
fraudulent concealment or wrongdoing on the part of the directors; the board may
truly believe that the case is frivolous and that aiding the shareholder in her suit
would not be in the best interests of the corporation. See Hecht v. Resolution Trust
Corp., 635 A.2d 394, 406 (Md. 1994) ("[S]ituations [exist] other than those which
involve fraud where a corporation can be blamelessly unaware of a potential claim
against directors and officers. Indeed, the directors and officers may be so
disengaged from their responsibilities that they themselves are unaware of the breach
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Given the heavy burden placed on a shareholder in pursuing a
derivative claim against a dominated board and the unlikelihood of
maintaining such an action, some form of the adverse domination
doctrine should still apply. As will be discussed later, however, the
possibility of a derivative suit should influence the appropriate level
of domination that will be required to invoke the doctrine. 5
IV. PROPER BOUNDARIES OF THE ADVERSE DOMINATION DOCTRINE
AS ANALYZED UNDER THE DISCOVERY RULE
Because adverse domination is essentially a variant of the
discovery rule, it seems appropriate that the doctrine should be
applied in a manner similar to the application of the discovery rule.
Although many courts recognize this analogy, confusion regarding
the proper boundaries of the adverse domination doctrine still
exists. This Part looks at the four major boundaries of the doctrine
that delineate its applicability: the required level of domination, the
required level of culpability, the doctrine's application to third
parties, and the party upon which the burden of proof should be
placed. From a discussion of each of these boundaries, a formula-
tion of the adverse domination doctrine will be extracted that is
logically consistent with the principles of the discovery rule.
A. The Required Level of Domination
1. Micro-Domination and Macro-Domination
Domination of a board of directors by one or more dominating
directors has long affected the interpretation of corporate law. 54
Two types of domination can be identified: micro-domination and
macro-domination.
155
Micro-domination occurs when one or more directors have
influence and power over the other directors to the extent that they
of their duty to the corporation.").
... See infra notes 171-73, 185-86 and accompanying text.
" See e.g., Fowle Memorial Hosp. Co. v. Nicholson, 126 S.E. 94, 97 (N.C. 1925)
(refusing to give validity to a board's approval of a lease between the corporation and
a dominating director); Lutherland, Inc. v. Dahlen, 53 A.2d 143, 145, 147 (Pa. 1947)
(refusing to sustain an action of the person who "largely dominated the Board of
Directors"); see also supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text (discussing the theory that
a dominated board prevents a corporation from taking action against dominating
directors).
155 These terms have not been advanced in the literature previously. Dividing
domination into these categories is useful for an analysis of adverse domination.
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are considered "dominating directors" or "dominating sharehold-
ers."156 This type of domination refers only to the influence of
one or two directors over the other directors. A dominant director
or shareholder interferes with the normal democratic interchange
among members of the board. 5 ' A board of directors generally
must act as a unit,158 and when one director has the power to
influence or control the board, that director is taking for herself the
power that ordinarily belongs to the board as a whole. Micro-
domination is exclusively concerned with the influence of the
dominating directors over the other members of the board.
The other type of domination, macro-domination, arises when
the board is controlled by a majority of directors who impose their
will on the corporation through their voting control on the board.
Here the domination is not by one or two directors over the other
board members; instead, the domination is by a majority of the
board over the decisions of the corporation. 159 Macro-domination
15 See Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1115 (Del. 1994)
(finding domination by a nonmajority stockholder when the "'directors deferred to
[the stockholder] because of its position as a significant stockholder and not because
they decided in the exercise of their own business judgment that [the stockholder's]
position was correct'" (citation omitted)); Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument
Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 70 (Del. 1989) ("For a dominating relationship to exist in the
absence of controlling stock ownership, a plaintiff must allege domination by a
minority shareholder through actual control of corporate conduct." (citations omit-
ted)); see also Charles Hansen et al., The Role of Disinterested Directors in "Conflict"
Transactions: The ALl Corporate Governance Project and Existing Law, 45 Bus. LAw.
2083, 2099-100 (1990) (explaining that, under § 5.10 of the ALI's Principles of
Corporate Governance, a 25% stockholder is considered a "dominating stockholder,"
which has the effect of imposing upon minority shareholders fiduciary duties
traditionally required only of dominating stockholders).
157 See Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 205 (Del. 1991) ("When lack of indepen-
dence is charged, a plaintiff must show that the Board is either dominated by an
officer or director who is the proponent of the challenged transaction or that the
Board is so under his influence that its discretion is 'sterilize[d].'" (citations omitted));
1 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 90, § 4-21, at 172 ("The desires of such a [dominat-
ing] director obviate the interplay of diverse judgments among several members of
the board." (citation omitted)).
15 See Hurley v. Ornsteen, 42 N.E.2d 273, 275-76 (Mass. 1942) (noting that in
certain circumstances a majority may bind a board without a meeting, but some type
of affirmative approval is required by all directors); Baldwin v. Canfield, 1 N.W. 261,
270 (Minn.) ("[Directors] have no authority to act [for the corporation], save when
assembled at a board meeting."), modified, 1 N.W. 276 (Minn. 1879); MODEL BUSINESS
CORP. AcT § 8.21 (1984) (stating that directors can bind a corporation without a
meeting only if the action is "taken by all members of the board" and evidenced by
"written consents"); 1 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 90, § 4-21, at 172 ("The
authority of the directors is conferred upon them as a board, their action is expected
to be taken as a group and not individually....").
159 See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Fleischer, 826 F. Supp. 1273, 1276 (D. Kan. 1993)
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is determined by the numerical power of board members to control
the corporation by majority vote. Influential control is irrelevant as
long as the dominating majority has a single viewpoint.
2. Adverse Domination Is a Form of Macro-Domination
Macro-domination affects the agent-principal relationship
between the board and the corporation. Because a corporation can
act only by majority vote, the actions of the board will not be
imputed to the principal corporation if the dominating majority is
acting adversely to the principal.16 Because the discovery rule
drives the adverse domination doctrine, the inquiry turns on
numerical control of the board'61 and, thus, macro-domination.
If micro-domination were enough to support a claim of adverse
domination, however, courts would have to look to the influence of
domination on the corporation's ability to bring suit. This result
would be analogous to fraudulent concealment because such an
inquiry would focus on the behavior of the defendant in preventing
the plaintiff from asserting a cause of action.
3. The Required Level of Numerosity
Although it is generally accepted that macro-domination is
required for adverse domination to apply, it remains unclear what
level of macro-domination is required. This section will discuss the
appropriate level of macro-domination by first analyzing the
problems at the extreme ends of the continuum. This section will
then show that the more appropriate test can be found in the
(noting that adverse domination results when directors charged with wrongful
conduct dominate a corporation such that the corporation itself is unable to gain
information about the activities of the directors); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Gardner,
798 F. Supp. 790, 795 (D.D.C. 1992) ("[W]here culpable directors and officers control
a corporation, they are unlikely to initiate actions or investigations for fear that such
actions will reveal their own wrongdoing."); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Hudson,
673 F. Supp. 1039, 1042 (D. Kan. 1987) (explaining that a corporation cannot bring
suit against its directors as long as those directors control the affairs of the
corporation); Leslie, supra note 11, at 1595 (noting that directors dominating a
corporation can effectively prevent the corporation from bringing suit "because
wrongdoers cannot be expected to initiate a cause of action against themselves").
11 See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text (discussing the imputation of
knowledge).
161 See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Bright, 872 F. Supp. 1551, 1565 (N.D. Tex. 1995)
(stating that the presence of adverse domination is determined by a numerical test);
supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text (noting that a corporation acts through
majority rule and thus the majority is the agent of the corporation).
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middle of the continuum.
At the lower end of the macro-domination scale would be
macro-domination in which the dominating directors would consist
of only a simple majority of the culpable directors.162 The Fifth
Circuit, in Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Dawson,163 held that
the FDIC "must show only that a majority of the board members
were wrongdoers during period [sic] the plaintiff seeks to toll the
statute."164 Under this formulation of the majority test, once the
plaintiff has shown that the corporation is governed by a board of
directors, the majority of whom are culpable, the statute of
limitations is tolled against them per se, provided the culpability
requirement is met. In Dawson, a majority of the directors con-
trolled the board; therefore, the court reasoned, the other directors
were powerless to stop them.
165
In Hecht v. Resolution Trust Corp.,166 the Maryland Court of
Appeals applied what it termed the "disinterested majority" test.
1 67
This test states that, until a disinterested majority takes control of
the board, the corporation is entitled to a presumption that it
cannot discover its cause of action. 16 The burden is placed on
the defendant to rebut the presumption by "showing that there was
someone who had the knowledge, ability and motivation to bring
suit during the period in which defendants controlled the corpora-
tion."'69 Thus, this is not a per se test. The rationale used by the
Hecht court for placing the burden on the defendant was that
culpable directors "have greater access to relevant information, and
it is more probable that no one else was in the position to bring
suit."
170
The main problem with any formulation of the majority test is
that it ignores the possibility of a shareholder derivative action.'
7 '
Disinterested directors in a numerically controlled board cannot
162 See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text (explaining the majority
requirement to show domination).
163 4 F.3d 1303 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2673 (1994).
164 Id. at 1310.
163 See id. (quoting Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Williams, 599 F. Supp. 1184, 1193-
94 n.12 (D. Md. 1984)).
166 635 A.2d 394 (Md. 1994).
167 See id. at 406.
168 See id. at 406-07.
169 Id. at 408.
170 Id.
1 See supra part III.C (discussing the dilemma of using the theory of adverse
domination when a suit is brought by shareholders on behalf of the corporation).
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force the board of directors to sue. They can, however, reveal the
necessary information to shareholders and encourage them to sue
or use the information to institute a suit themselves on behalf of the
corporation. Such information revealed from an insider should
make it possible for the shareholders to plead with the necessary
specificity. 72 This in turn would allow the derivative plaintiffs to
obtain discovery, 171 thereby allowing the suit to proceed within the
statutory period.
At the other end of the scale is a rule that forbids application of
the adverse domination doctrine unless the plaintiff proves that
every member of the board was involved in the domination-that the
board was completely numerically dominated.1 74  Unless the
plaintiff proves that the board was completely dominated, adverse
domination would not apply as a matter of law.
Although the complete domination test resolves the inherent
tension of the possibility of a derivative suit, it has its own theoreti-
cal failings. In general, the discovery rule does not require that it
be absolutely impossible for a plaintiff to discover her cause of
action. Instead, the discovery rule requires only that it be so
difficult to discover the cause of action that a plaintiff exercising
reasonable diligence could not do so. 175 If complete domination
were required to invoke adverse domination, it would be the same
as saying that it must be impossible to discover the cause of action
before the statute of limitations can be tolled. In reality this would
" See supra notes 143-52 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties in
bringing a derivative suit).
17s See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty in
obtaining discovery).
174 This interpretation comes from the language in International Railways of
Central America v. United Fruit Co., 373 F.2d 408, 414 (2d Cir.) ("[A] plaintiff who
seeks to toll the statute on the basis of domination of a corporation has the burden
of showing 'a full, complete and exclusive control in the directors or officers
charged.'" (quoting Payne v. Ostrus, 501.2d 1039, 1042 (8th Cir. 1931)), cert. denied,
387 U.S. 921 (1967). Some commentators have considered this to be the end of the
matter-if the plaintiff cannot show complete domination, she loses. See, e.g., Leslie,
supra note 11, at 1595. The courts have hedged this interpretation, however, by
requiring only that a plaintiff "negate the possibility that an informed stockholder or
director could have induced the corporation to sue" in order to show exclusive
control. International Rys., 373 F.2d at 414. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit, although
claiming to apply a complete domination test, applies adverse domination if the
plaintiff can show that "an informed director, though capable of suing, would not do
so." Farmers & Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Bryan, 902 F.2d 1520, 1523 (10th Cir. 1990).
For further discussion of the development of this strand of the test, see supra notes
73-81 and accompanying text.
"75 See supra note 47 and accompanying text (explaining the discovery rule).
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require every single director to be culpable-even those who have no
knowledge or are uninformed. This is, of course, logically impossi-
ble because an uninformed director could never be culpable.
176
Allowing adverse domination only when all directors are knowledge-
able and culpable would be inconsistent with the underlying
principle of the discovery rule and would vitiate the ability of a
plaintiff to effectively invoke the adverse domination doctrine in
many situations.
Thus, neither extreme level of macro-domination is without its
failings. As such, courts have begun to create macro-domination
tests that place the required level of numerical control in the middle
of the continuum. For example, the court in Resolution Trust Corp.
v. Farmer17' held that to toll the statute of limitations, the plaintiff
must prove that "an informed, empowered, but not culpable person
or persons, did not exist from the time the statute of limitations
began to run."178 This formulation is very similar to the complete
domination test; however, it does not require that uninformed
directors be culpable. If some directors are uninformed, they will
be treated as not being able to encourage a derivative suit.
The court in Clark v. Milam79 slightly modified this approach
by holding that "the adverse domination doctrine tolls the statute
of limitations so long as there is no one who knows of and is able
and willing to redress the misconduct of those who are committing
the torts against the corporate plaintiff."' Clark moves further
away from the complete domination test by allowing a knowledge-
able director to be present as long as the director was one who was
not able and willing to sue.
Both Farmer and Clark set the level of macro-domination at a
level that avoids theoretical discrepancies with the principles
underlying the discovery rule. The cases agree that if the plaintiff
can demonstrate that there were no disinterested directors on the
board, adverse domination should apply.' This approach cer-
176 For the purposes of this Comment it is assumed that there is no liability for a
director who does not know of the injury but should have known.
17 865 F. Supp. 1143 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
'
78 Id. at 1158 (emphasis added).
' 452 S.E.2d 714 (W. Va. 1994).
'oId. at 720 (emphasis added).
See Farmer, 865 F. Supp. at 1157-58 (holding that "the statute will be tolled if
there was no informed but not culpable person" (citation omitted)); Clark, 452 S.E.2d
at 720 (holding that the statute is tolled until one of the directors is willing to redress
the wrong).
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tainly makes sense, because if the board contains no disinterested
directors, there is neither a majority to bring suit nor a single
director to reveal the cause of action to the shareholders.182  The
cases also agree that if the plaintiff can prove that there was no
member of the board of directors who actually knew of the injury,
the knowledge should not be imputed to the board or share-
holders.
18 3
The only disagreement between the two cases is whether the
knowledge of a director who knows the corporation has a cause of
action but chooses not to inform the shareholders should be
imputed to the corporation to start the statute running.1 8 4 This
is a difficult question. Other discovery rule cases provide little guid-
ance because they generally do not involve a multitude of potential
plaintiffs who could discover the cause of action and bring suit.
This Comment, however, will show that the better rule is that
knowledge of a nonculpable, nondominating director who simply
chooses not to bring suit should be imputed to the corporation.
First, a director almost certainly will be a shareholder.8 5 There-
fore, once she is presented with information, she is capable of
bringing a shareholder derivative suit for the corporation. It seems
consistent that once a shareholder is capable of suing, but chooses
" See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text (noting that in cases of complete
domination, no independent directors remain from whom the cause of action can be
concealed).
"' See Farmer, 865 F. Supp. at 1158 (noting that the plaintiff must prove there are
no knowledgeable, nonculpable directors); Clark, 452 S.E.2d at 720 (noting that the
plaintiff must prove there is no one knowledgeable of the injury and willing to act on
it).
'84 The Farmer court seems to suggest that if a knowledgeable person simply
chooses not to act, the statute will run because it requires that the plaintiff prove that
"an informed, empowered, but not culpable, person or persons, did not exist." Farmer,
865 F. Supp. at 1158 (emphasis added). Clark is not as clear in its language, but it
seems to suggest that the informed directors must be willing to act on that
knowledge. See Clark, 452 S.E.2d at 720 (holding that "the adverse domination
doctrine tolls the statute of limitations so long as there is no one who knows of and
is able and willing to redress the misconduct").
185 Directors may receive stock as part of their compensation. See Corporate
Director's Guidebook, 49 Bus. LAW. 1243, 1260 (1994) (noting that "some believe that
stock options and restricted stock grants to directors strengthen directors' interest in
the overall success of the corporation"). In addition, the federal government has
shown its concern that directors of corporations may use their inside information to
trade on the shares. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78 (p) (1988) (requiring the "filing of [a] statement of ownership of all securities of
issuer by [an] owner of more than ten [percent] of any class of security").
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not to, the statute must begin to run, regardless whether that
particular shareholder is also a director."8 6
Second, and most importantly, the directors who were not
culpable originally may become culpable by their failure to act. By
failing to divulge the dominating directors' activities, the non-
dominating directors may become aiders and abetters to the
dominating directors' tort."8 7 In these circumstances, it may be
appropriate to include these directors in the category of "culpable
directors," thereby creating a board that is in fact completely
dominated and devoid of nonculpable persons.
The inquiry will, of course, be fact-specific."' 8 Consider the
case in which a majority of the board has defrauded one of its credi-
tors. If the nondefrauding directors do not act because they do not
believe there is a valid claim in the information or because they do
not believe that the directors who committed the violation did so
for the purpose of gain, they would probably not be culpable. If,
however, they believed the cause to be valid and refused to disclose
the information, they may well be culpable.' 89 Thus, the proper
18 This seems to be an appropriate line to draw. Once a shareholder knows of
a cause of action but chooses not to act on it, it seems reasonable that knowledge
should be imputed to the corporation. See Clark, 452 S.E.2d at 720 ("If, however,
shareholders learn of misconduct that harms their corporation, the discovery rule may
no longer toll the limitations period." (citing International Rys. of Cent. Am. v.
United Fruit Co., 373 F.2d 408, 414 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 921 (1967))).
117 The best analogy here would probably be aiding and abetting a violation of the
rule against insider trading in the case of an insider tipper and an outsider tippee, the
scenario in Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). In such a case, the tipper would be the
dominating directors and the tippee would be the nondominating directors. Dirks
held that the tippee is liable for disclosing inside information when it would be a
violation of the tipper's fiduciary duty and the tippee knows that it would be a viola-
tion. See id. at 660. The tippee assumes the tipper's duty in such cases. See id.
Using the same logic as the Dirks court, it could be argued that if the tipper has
a duty to disclose rather than a duty to not disclose, and the tippee (nondominator)
knows that the tipper (dominator) has this duty, the tippee is aiding and abetting the
tipper's fiduciary duty by refusing to disclose the information once the tippee
becomes aware of it. Cf. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Dawson, 4 F.3d 1303, 1312
(5th Cir. 1993) ("[Ilt could almost always be said that when one or two directors
actively injure the corporation, or profit at the corporation's expense, the remaining
directors are at least negligent for failing to exercise 'every precaution or investiga-
tion.'" (quoting International Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 368 S.W.2d 567, 580
(Tex. 1963))), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2673 (1994).
188 Cf Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663-64 (a court should look at "objective facts" in
determining the purpose of the tipper and the scienter of the tippee).
189 The Court in Dirks held that it was the tipper's purpose in divulging the
information that was relevant. See id. at 662 ("Whether disclosure is a breach of duty
therefore depends in large part on the purpose of the disclosure."). If the tippee
believes that the tipper has not divulged the information for gain, the tippee generally
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formulation for the domination element of the adverse domination
doctrine is for the doctrine to apply when the plaintiff is able to
prove that the board of directors was either completely dominated
by those charged with having committed the tort or that none of the
nondominating directors knew that the cause of action existed. 9
B. The Required Level of Culpability: Negligence
The analysis behind the proper level of culpability is much more
straightforward. The discovery rule emerged from medical
malpractice claims.191  Therefore, if the adverse domination
doctrine is truly a variant of the discovery rule, it would be illogical
to require a culpability requirement greater than negligence.
1 92
Nonetheless, many courts require some type of affirmative miscon-
duct because of their concern that the use of the adverse domina-
tion doctrine would become too widespread if it were applied to
merely negligent conduct.
193
will not be aiding and abetting. See id.
In accQrdance with this reasoning, and continuing with the directors analogy, if
the nondominating directors do not divulge the information because they believe the
dominators have not really done anything wrong, the nondominating directors should
be absolved and not considered culpable. If they do not reveal the information when
they know that the cause of action is valid, however, they would be aiders and
abetters and, therefore, culpable.
190 Whether the doctrine should apply when the nondominating directors have no
actual knowledge of the suit, but should have known, is beyond the scope of this
Comment. This question, however, maybe analyzed under the Dirks rubric. Seesupra
notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
191 See Heriot, supra note 12, at 955-56 (noting that the discovery rule began with
medical malpractice cases, then expanded to legal malpractice and products liability
cases); McHugh, supra note 46, at 197 (noting that the modern discovery rule stems
from a Pennsylvania Supreme Court case involving a sponge left inside a patient);
Diane Kosmach, Note, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 568, 568-69 (1976) (noting Illinois's
expansion of its use of the discovery rule from medical malpractice to other areas of
professional malpractice).
19 For example, the court in Clark v. Milam, 452 S.E.2d 714 (W. Va. 1994), held
that the degree of culpability is irrelevant because the reason for tolling the statute
of limitations is that the plaintiffs cannot discover the cause of action. See id. at 719.
193 See e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Acton, No. 94-10375, 1995 WL 144124, at
*5 (5th Cir. April 4, 1995) (noting that because the adverse domination doctrine
might be "liberally applied," gross negligence is insufficient to toll the statute);
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Dawson, 4 F.3d 1303, 1312 (5th Cir. 1993) ("If adverse
domination theory is not to overthrow the statute of limitations completely in the
corporate context, it must be limited to those cases in which the culpable directors
have been active participants in wrongdoing or fraud, rather than simply negligent."),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2673 (1994); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Bright, 872 F. Supp.
1551, 1567 (N.D. Tex. 1995) ("Without addressing'precisely how culpable a majority
of directors must be before adverse domination tolling is available,' ... [Dawson]
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The courts are correct in their concerns; however, the potential
for such problems occurs whenever the discovery rule is applied, no
matter what the context, because most discovery rule cases involve
negligence causes of action."9 4 In accordance with this reasoning,
the Kansas Supreme Court recently recognized that the culpability
required in adverse domination cases must be consistent with that
in discovery rule cases. In Resolution Trust Corp. v. Scaletty,195 the
court held that because it had repeatedly delayed accrual of the
statute of limitations in other negligence contexts, it would be
illogical not to do the same for adverse domination cases.19 6 The
court expressed reluctance to change a policy that had been
reaffirmed over the years by the courts. 9 7 Therefore, if courts are
unwilling to apply the adverse domination doctrine to negligence
claims, they should be equally unwilling to apply the discovery rule
to negligence claims. In other words, based on the historical use of
the discovery rule, adverse domination should certainly apply to
negligence claims. 98
nevertheless instructs that Texas courts will not extend adverse domination tolling
[when tolling] would risk eliminating the statute of limitations in all cases involving
a corporation's claims against its own directors ... ." (quoting Dawson, 4 F.3d at 1313
n.4)); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Farmer, 865 F. Supp. 1143, 1157 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
(striking what the judge considered to be a fair balance between the rights of
defendants and plaintiffs by requiring a showing that conduct was more culpable than
mere negligence).
14 See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text (discussing the use of the
discovery rule in general contexts and noting negligence-based claims in which the
discovery rule was applied).
195 No. 72,230, 1995 WL 111986 (Kan. Mar. 17, 1995).
1 See id. at *8.
197 See id.
19' It could be argued that the required culpability level is higher than negligence
based on agency principles. It is the axiom that knowledge is not imputed to a
principal when her agent is acting adversely to her that puts adverse domination in
line with the discovery rule. See supra notes 121-27 and accompanying text (aligning
adverse domination to the discovery rule based on agency principles). The
Restatement defines "acting adversely" as follows:
The mere fact that the agent's primary interests are not coincident with
those of the principal does not prevent the latter from being affected by the
knowledge of the agent if the agent is acting for the principal's interests.
The rule as stated herein is substantially similar to the rule stated in
Sections 235-236, dealing with the liability of a principal or master for the
torts of his agent ....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 121, § 282 cmt. c.
The cross references noted in the Restatement comment may lead one to
conclude that the agent must be acting outside the scope of her employment to be
governed by the adverse interest exception. See id. § 235 (defining conduct outside
the scope of employment). Following this line of reasoning would lead to a
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C. The Adverse Domination Doctrine Is
Applicable to Third Parties
If adverse domination is analyzed as a variant of the discovery
rule, corporations should be able to invoke the doctrine to toll the
statute of limitations against third parties. Indeed, two of the most
recent cases to consider the issue have reached this conclusion.1 99
The logic supporting the conclusion that corporations should be
able to invoke the adverse domination doctrine against third parties
is quite straightforward. The discovery rule focuses on the disability
conclusion that the agent must be acting in a fraudulent manner in order for the
adverse interest exception to apply. See, e.g., Mirror Group Newspapers, PLC v.
Maxwell Newspapers, Inc. (In re Maxwell Newspapers, Inc.), 164 B.R. 858,866 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("Under the 'adverse interest exception,' when an agent's motive and
conduct demonstrate that he has totally abandoned his principal's interest and is
acting to defraud his principal, ... his knowledge and misconduct will not be
imputed to his principal."). This in turn would allow the discovery rule to drive
adverse domination only in these circumstances.
The analogy is incorrect, however, because the adverse interest exception will
most often be invoked to vitiate the knowledge of the principal in a claim by a third
party. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 121, § 282 cmt. a.,
illus. 1-3; Id. § 235 cmt. a, illus. 1-3. The same concerns for the rights of innocent
third parties, see, e.g., Aiello v. Ed Saxe Real Estate, Inc., 499 A.2d 282, 287 (Pa. 1985)
("[A] principal is liable to innocent third parties for the... torts ... of his agent."),
are not present when the principal is suing her negligent agent directly. See Bostrom
v.Jennings, 40 N.W.2d 97, 102 (Mich. 1949) ("[W]hile the negligence of the agent is
imputable to the principal making him liable to third parties, it is not imputable to
him so as to bar his right to recover from the agent what he has been required to pay
as compensation to such third parties."). Thus, although in many contexts some type
of affirmative misconduct will be required to invoke the exceptions stated in § 282
of the Restatement, this is not the case in the adverse domination context because no
third parties are involved, and there is no concern with third party reliance on the
acts of the principal's agent. Indeed, courts applying adverse domination under these
agency principals have recognized that negligence is sufficient to invoke the discovery
rule. See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Smith, 872 F. Supp. 805, 813 (D. Or. 1995)
(citing the Restatement and holding that "[t]he knowledge of the defendants cannot
as a matter of law be imputed to [the bank] for the purposes of claims against them
for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract"); Resolution Trust
Corp. v. Scaletty, No. 72,230, 1995 WL 111986, at *8 (Kan. Mar. 17, 1995) (holding
that the adverse domination doctrine applies to negligence claims); Clark v. Milam,
452 S.E.2d 714, 719 (W. Va. 1994) (same).
'" See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Farmer, 865 F. Supp. 1143, 1158 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
("[I]f the facts persuade ajury that the statute of limitations should be tolled with
respect to the Inside Director Defendants, then it should be tolled as to the Attorney
Defendants as well."); Clark v. Milam, 452 S.E.2d 714, 716, 719 (W. Va. 1994)
(applying adverse domination to lawyers and accountants); see also Hanna, supra note
61, at 653 ("A majority of the cases ... have accepted that attorneys can exercise
domination of an institution .... ).
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of the plaintiff."' Thus, as long as the cause of action is inher-
ently unknowable, the corporation should be allowed to invoke the
doctrine against third parties it would have sued but for the
dominating board. There is no reason to refuse to apply the
doctrine to third-party defendants against whom the corporation
had a cause of action while it was "incapacitated" by lack of knowl-
edge.
20 1
Of course, it is important that the underlying causes of action
are related to the adverse actions that are alleged against the
dominating directors.0 2 A typical situation is where the corpora-
tion has a cause of action against the lawyers and accountants who
were involved with the breach of duty by the culpable directors. If
claims against such third parties arise out of the same cause of
action as that against the culpable directors, there is no reason not
to apply the doctrine of adverse domination against those third
parties.
20 3
Despite the strong argument in favor of applying the doctrine
to third parties, many courts still refuse to do so. This refusal
is usually grounded in a fear that applying the doctrine to third
parties would expand liability too much.2 4 As with the culpability
requirement, however, the problem lies with the discovery rule as
a whole and not with the adverse domination doctrine alone.
21 See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text (discussing the discovery rule).
21 See Farmer, 865 F. Supp. at 1158 (applying the discovery rule to nondirector
defendants); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Gardner, 798 F. Supp. 790, 795 (D.D.C. 1992)
(same); Clark, 452 S.E.2d at 716, 719 (same); cf. Mosesian v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell
& Co., 727 F.2d 873, 879 (9th Cir.) (discussing the possibility of tolling due to
domination against an outside accountant, but finding insufficient evidence to do so),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 (1984).
" See Gardner, 798 F. Supp. at 795 (stating that the rationale behind the rule is
that the insiders are afraid of revealing their own wrongdoing); Clark, 452 S.E.2d at
718-19 (stating that the causes of action must be related to the domination of the
company).
20" See Farmer, 865 F. Supp. at 1158 (applying the discovery rule against outside
parties without regard to their status as negligent or nonnegligent, even though the
court had earlier required that the inside parties' conduct rise to a culpability level
greater than negligence).
204 See, e.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Shrader & York, 991 F.2d 216, 227 (5th
Cir. 1993) (stating that the "narrow doctrine" of adverse domination should not be
applied to nonofficers and nondirectors), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 2704 (1994).
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D. Burden of Proof
The final boundary of the adverse domination doctrine concerns
which party should bear the burden of proving that the board was
macro-dominated. Courts have not been consistent in deciding this
issue.2"' This section will argue that, under a discovery rule
analysis, the plaintiff should bear the burden of proof.
Discovery rule cases generally hold that once the defendant has
proven that the claim is otherwise barred, the plaintiff bears the
burden of proving that the statute should be tolled."' Of the
cases addressing the adverse domination doctrine, both Farmer and
Clark have adopted this approach. °7
Contrary to discovery rule principles, the Hecht court believed
that the burden should be on the defendant because she has better
access to relevant information. The Hecht court stated that putting
"this burden upon the defendants who control the corporation's
information shifts the balance more fairly between the defendants
and the corporation." 28 Although the court is correct in its
assertion that the information is difficult to discover because it is
largely in the control of the defendants, it does not follow that this
situation is so unfair as to negate the normal operation of the
discovery rule.219  Director misconduct is no more difficult to
discover than a sponge in the body of a patient or an attorney's
205 See supra part II.B.4.
2
1 See Shrader, 991 F.2d at 220 ("In Texas, the party seeking to benefit from the
discovery rule 'bear[s] the burden of proving and securing favorable findings
thereon.'" (alteration in original) (quoting Woods v. William M. Mercer, Inc., 769
S.W.2d 515, 518 (Tex. 1988))); Balsavage v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. 712 F. Supp.
461, 470 (D.N.J. 1989) (placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff to "establish[] a
favorable date of discovery"); Gunsalus v. Celotex Corp., 674 F. Supp. 1149, 1155
(E.D. Pa. 1987) (stating that "the burden of proof is on plaintiff to show that the
discovery rule applies"); Owens v. Lac D'Amiante Du Quebec, Ltee., 656 F. Supp. 981,
982 (E.D. Pa.) ("Although defendants bear the burden of proof on the statute of
limitations defense.., plaintiffs bear the burden of proving that the discovery rule
should apply."), aff'd, 833 F.2d 306 (3d Cir. 1987); Doe v. Cherwitz, 518 N.W.2d 362,
364 (Iowa 1994) (stating that the plaintiff bears burden of proving when "the alleged
victim discovered the injury or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have
discovered it" for statute of limitation purposes); Palenkas v. Beaumont Hosp., 443
N.W.2d 354, 364 (Mich. 1994) (holding that "it is consistent both for the defendant
to have the initial burden of production on its affirmative defense and for the
plaintiff to have the ultimate burden of convincing the jury that his claim is timely").
207 See Farmer, 865 F. Supp. at 1158; Clark v. Milam, 452 S.E.2d 714, 720 (W. Va.
1994).2
' Hecht v. Resolution Trust Corp., 635 A.2d 394, 408 (Md. 1994).
" The Hecht court noted the problems associated with a derivative suit. See id.
at 407-08. This, however, only explains why the discovery rule should apply.
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malpractice. In each of these situations, the defendant has better
access to the relevant information, yet the courts still place the
burden of proof on the plaintiff. Indeed, Judge Bell dissented in
Hecht on this very issue, arguing that the plaintiff should bear this
burden.
210
V. TOWARD REPOSE
This Comment has proposed the proper boundaries of the
adverse domination doctrine under a discovery rule analysis. The
doctrine should only apply when the plaintiff can show that the
board was macro-dominated. Macro-domination in the adverse
domination context requires that all directors be culpable except
those who are uninformed or unknowledgeable. Furthermore, the
doctrine should be invoked for purely negligent acts of direc-
tors211 and against third parties whose negligent actions are
directly related to such actions of the directors. The burden of
proof should be placed on the plaintiff. This is a correct formula-
tion of the adverse domination doctrine based on the theory and
principles of the discovery rule; however, the question remains
whether this is an acceptable doctrine. To understand the potential-
ly harsh consequences of such a doctrine consider the following
example:
John and Sally open a closely held banking corporation, Best
Bank, Inc., in 1950. Together they own two-thirds of the shares of
the corporation; the other third is held by their cousin, Tim. John
and Sally are the only directors of the corporation. Tim is not
involved in the day-to-day operations of Best Bank and is a silent
minority shareholder-he simply lent his money to John and Sally
hoping for a large return.
In 1951, while still new at the business, John and Sally make
a large loan upon the advice of their accounting firm, Cash &
Spend. Unfortunately forJohn and Sally, they did not investigate
the loan as thoroughly as they should have. In 1955 the debtor
defaults, and the company loses a significant amount of money.
John and Sally continue to run the corporation successfully for the
210 Judge Bell took issue with the authority used to support the majority's position
that defendants bear the burden on statute of limitations issues. He believed that,
generally, it is the plaintiff who bears the burden of showing that the statute of
limitations is tolled. See id. at 410-11 (Bell, J., dissenting).
211 Directors, except in certain limited situations, must be grossly negligent to be
liable to the corporation. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing the
business judgment rule).
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next thirty years. In 1990 they retire and sell their interest to Tim,
who takes over the company and becomes the sole director of the
company. In 1991 Tim discovers the bad loan made in 1951 and
initiates a suit against John, Sally, and Cash & Spend on behalf of
the company. Tim and Best Bank attempt to invoke the adverse
domination doctrine.
Tim and Best Bank have an excellent opportunity to prevent
the accrual of the cause of action for forty years. John and Sally
completely dominated the board of directors for the entire forty
years, so it was impossible for the corporation to learn of the
adverse actions of the directors. 212 The directors and the ac-
counting firm were probably negligent in their failure to carefully
investigate the claim.213  Therefore, the parties are sufficiently
culpable to allow tolling under the adverse domination doctrine as
analyzed in connection with the discovery rule.214 Finally, Cash
& Spend would also be subject to tolling because it is liable on a
cause of action arising out of the same cause of action for which
the dominating directors would be liable.
215
If this result seems extreme, it should. Tolling the statute of
limitations against directors and accountants for negligent acts that
happened a half century ago seems outrageous. It is not surprising
that courts have balked at creating an interpretation of adverse
domination that could lead to such a result. But the problem here
is of the judges' own making. The judiciary is largely responsible
for the expansive use of the discovery rule.216 It is interesting that
judges hesitate to expand the discovery rule in the corporate
212 See supra part IV.A (discussing levels of domination and the inability of the
corporation to discover adverse actions).
213 Directors have an obligation to fully investigate their business decisions. See,
e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) ("The determination of
whether a businessjudgment is an informed one turns on whether the directors have
informed themselves 'prior to making a business decision, of all material information
reasonably available to them.'" (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del.
1984))). Officers and directors of financial institutions are held to an even higher
standard. See I KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 90, § 11-1, at 399 ("The tendency has
been to hold directors of depository institutions to a more stringent liability standard
than directors of business corporations . .. ").
214 See supra part IV.B (discussing negligence as a sufficient level of culpability for
corporate directors).
21' See supra part IV.C (discussing the applicability of the adverse domination
doctrine to third parties).
216 See Heriot, supra note 12, at 954 (noting that American courts have "en-
graft[ed] everexpanding discovery rules into statutes of limitation"); Developments,
supra note 11, at 1200 (noting that courts have altered the limitations period through
liberal interpretation of the word "accrue").
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context but not in the area of other torts, such as malpractice and
products liability. The same example cited above could easily apply
to a medical malpractice case. What if a sponge left in a patient did
not cause harm until forty years after it was left there?
It seems that the important underlying policy of the statute of
limitations, repose,117 has been abandoned completely by the
courts' creation of far-reaching discovery rules.2 1 s Allowing a forty-
year-old claim to proceed would seem to undermine completely
what the Supreme Court found to be the important purpose of
statutes of limitations: "to promote justice by preventing surprises
through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber
until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses
have disappeared."2 19
A. Problems with the Death of Repose
22 0
One of the most important virtues of repose is that it allows
people to better estimate their potential liability and, therefore, plan
for the future.2 1 A rational director will choose whether to serve
on a board based on a consideration of the benefits she expects to
draw from the position balanced against the costs and potential
risks she associates with the job.2 22 Directors expect that they may
be subject to liability, and they therefore purchase insurance to
cover this risk.223  Under a liability scheme with an expansive
2 11 See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text (discussing the proposition that
repose to defendants is the primary underlying purpose of statutes of limitations).
218 See Heriot, supra note 12, at 961 ("[C]ourts have adopted discovery rules that
make it extremely difficult for defendants ever to feel secure.").
219 Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342,348-
49 (1944).
0 The problems related to balancing the repose to be given to a corporate officer
against the right ofa plaintiffto recover for wrongful conduct extend well beyond the
scope of this Comment. Instead, this section of the Comment simply illustrates that
adverse domination is another weight on the scales that tilts the balance away from
repose. A primary purpose of this section is to further academic, legislative, and
judicial debate on the balance to be struck between repose and the plaintiff's right
to recovery in corporate domination cases.
22 See RiCHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.15, at 587 (4th ed.
1992) (noting that one purpose of statutes of limitations is "to enable people to plan
their activities with greater certainty"); Leslie, supra note 11, at 1590 ("In this way,
preventing unfair surprise accommodates business planning and protects the
reasonable expectations of potential defendants."); cf. Josephine H. Hicks, Note, The
Constitutionality of Statutes of Repose: Federalism Reigns, 38 VAND. L. REV. 627, 632-33
(1985) (discussing how repose leads to more certainty in insurance rates).
222 See generally POSNER, supra note 221, §§ 1.1-.3 (discussing the economic values
and costs associated with various choices of action).
22 See 2 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 90, § 23-1, at 335-37 (discussing the
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discovery rule, however, a director's term of potential liability
becomes less certain. The potential variability in repose for
defendants will increase risk and therefore make insurance
premiums more expensive. 2 4 In addition, other recent develop-
ments in director liability have already made it more difficult for
directors to obtain insurance, 225 and the potential increase in the
time period in which these directors may be subject to liability may
make insurance even more difficult to obtain. All of these factors
will tend to discourage qualified people from serving on boards of
directors. The law must grant some measure of repose after a
reasonable period of time if it wants to encourage capable people
to serve on boards of directors.
Another important problem with the judicial expansion of
discovery rules has been pointed out in a discussion by Professor
Gail Heriot.22' Legislatures create statutes of limitations for a
purpose-namely, for granting repose to defendants and increasing
judicial efficiency by preventing stale claims. 22' The function of
courts is to interpret legislation, not to rewrite it.228 Statutes of
importance of director and officer liability insurance); Richard A. Myers,Jr., Where
Have All the Directors Gone: Corporate Director and Officer Liability and Coping with the
Insurance Crisis, 36 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 575, 576 (1988) ("Traditional protection... in
past years has been director and officer liability insurance.").
" See Scott, supra note 48, at 332 ("The effects of the new rule will include
increased litigation, undetermined exposure to liability, and probable increased
insurance costs."); Hicks, supra note 221, at 632-33 ("Theoretically, by cutting off a
defendant's liability after a given number of years, statutes of repose lead to more
certain liability and thus provide greater actuarial precision in setting insurance
rates.").
' Much of this difficulty is related to the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), which applied a standard of "gross
negligence" to directors' decisions that many commentators thought was closer to
simple negligence than gross negligence. See Larry D. Soderquist, The Proper Standard
forDirector's Negligence Liability, 66 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 37,37 (1990) (discussing the
impact of Van Gorkom on director insurance); see also Myers, supra note 223, at 576
("[I]nsurers have been prompted to either cease writing director and officer coverage
or to provide such coverage at greatly inflated premiums with an increased number
of exclusions.").
22 See generally Heriot, supra note 12 (arguing for legislative preference of a rule-
like statute of limitations).
See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
2 8 See Efrat M. Cogan, Note, Executive Nonacquiescense: Problems of Statutoiy
Interpretation and Separation of Powers, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143, 1153 (1987) (noting
that "when the judiciary interprets statutory law, it does so with the knowledge that
the legislature can alter such an interpretation so that it conforms to majoritarian
desires"); Craig W. Dallon, Note, InterpretingStatutes Faithfully-Not Dynamically, 1991
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1353, 1354 (noting that "dynamic statutory interpretation is not
desirable"). See generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI.
1995] 1115
1116 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143:1065
limitations were created as legal rules setting forth a specific period
after which a claim could not be brought.22 9 By incorporating
expansive discovery rules into statutes of limitations, the result is a
rule of law that is "stripped of much of its rulelike character."
2 0
One could argue that by using the word "accrue," legislatures
impliedly grant discretion to courts to determine the period of time
in which an action can be brought.2"' Indeed, some legislatures
have even created specific discovery rules by statute.2 2 It does
not seem reasonable, however, that a legislature would have
intended to allow a court to postpone accrual on a cause of action
for forty years. 2 1 Such a scenario undermines the legislative
policies that were the basis of statutes of limitations.234  Why
would a legislature create a two-year limitation for tort actions if it
were possible to sue forty years after the tort occurred?
B. A Legislative Solution
It seems reasonable to assume that courts have incorporated
discovery rules into statutes of limitations because they believe that
in many cases the limitations provided by the legislature are too
short. Legislatures have often done little to respond to the
increasingly loose standards applied by the courts; and, to some
degree, the courts may be justified in the theory that the legislature
has deferred to them. 2 5 The legislature, however, must not shirk
L. REV. 1175 (1989) (exploring the dichotomy between general rules and personal
discretion in the context of law made by the courts).
' See Heriot, supra note 12, at 923-27 (noting that while there has long been "a
desire to keep stale cases out of the courts, in practice this policy has been applied
in an uneven and erratic manner").2 30 Id. at 960.
231 See id. at 960-61 (noting the argument that "[c]ourts that have adopted
expansive discovery rules have done so with the implicit consent of legislatures");
Developments, supra note 11, at 1200 (noting that courts use the word "accrue" as the
springboard for their intervention).
2
32 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 7-2-725 (1993) (discovery rule for the sale of goods);
ALASKA STAT. § 45.02.725 (1962) (same); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.1 (West 1995)
(discovery rule for childhood sexual abuse cases).
255 Cf Heriot,supra note 12, at 962 ("When an expansive discovery rule was added
... the balance struck by the legislature between the plaintiff-focused principle and
the defendant-focused principle was jarred massively out of kilter. It hardly seems
likely that this would appeal to legislatures.").
21 See id.; see also supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text (discussing the repose
purpose of statutes of limitations).
" See Heriot, supra note 12, at 963-67 (discussing the problems faced by
legislatures in trying to control the courts' use- of discovery rules).
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its responsibility.
A reasonable response to the problem would be to combine the
shorter limitations period with a longer statute of repose. Statutes
of limitations and statutes of repose are often confused but are, in
fact, two distinct types of statutes.236  Statutes of limitations are
the statutes that have been discussed thus far in this Comment.
Statutes of repose, on the other hand, grant an absolute period
within which a suit must be brought.2 7 Statutes of repose are not
subject to tolling.
238
Some states have already combined statutes of limitations with
longer statutes of repose in response to the expansive use of the
discovery rule in medical malpractice cases. 219  Given the poten-
tially broad sweep of the adverse domination doctrine, a similar
solution seems appropriate in the context of director liability.
Legislatures could enact statutes that read as follows:
A suit arising out of a claim for breach of duty against an officer
or director may be brought within two years after the cause of
action accrues, but in no event later than ten years from the date
of the alleged tortious conduct.
24°
258 See Hicks, supra note 221, at 628-29 ("Although both prescribe the time period
within which plaintiffs must bring suit, important differences exist between statutes
of limitations and statutes of repose."); Leslie, supra note 11, at 1591 ("Statutes of
limitation are sometimes called statutes of repose. However, there is a distinction."
(footnote omitted)).
11 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(4)(b) (West 1982) (providing that medical
malpractice action accrues at time of discovery, but "in no event shall the action be
commenced later than 4 years from the date of the incident or occurrence out of
which the cause of action accrued"); Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v.
Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2782 (1991) (establishing a three-year statute of repose
for 10b-5 actions); Hicks, supra note 221, at 629 (noting that statutes of repose place
an absolute restriction on the time period in which a plaintiff may bring suit).
238 See ADOLPHJ. LEVY, SOLVING STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PROBLEMS § 3.01 (1987)
("[A] statute of repose may commence and may run before the cause of action
accrues-even before the plaintiff was injured."); Leslie, supra note 11, at 1591
("[W]hen applying statutes of repose,judges can not employ their equitable powers
in tailoring the law to the specific circumstances.").
29 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(4)(b) (setting forth a two-year statute of
limitations and a four-year statute of repose for medical malpractice actions); GA.
CODE ANN. § 9-3-71(c) (Supp. 1994) ("Subsection (a) of this Code section is intended
to create a two-year statute of limitations. Subsection (b) of this Code section is
intended to create a five-year statute of ultimate repose and abrogation."); cf IND.
CODE ANN. § 27-12-7-1 (West Supp. 1994) (creating a statute of repose for medical
malpractice cases).
240 Cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(4)(b) (providing a similarly worded statute for
medical malpractice claims); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-3-71(a), (b) (Supp. 1994) (same);
Hicks, supra note 221, at 629 ("[A] products liability statute may provide that an
action must be brought within six years of injury but in no event may a plaintiff
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This type of statute would allow a court to toll the statute of
limitations based on adverse domination for up to ten years after
the allegedly tortious conduct, but thereafter, the claim would be
absolutely barred. In essence, the legislature would be giving the
courts leeway to toll the statute of limitations when it would be just
to do so. The legislature, however, would also be insuring some
measure of repose by setting an outer limit beyond which suit could
not be brought.2 4' Thus, a fair balance would be struck between
repose for defendants and fairness to plaintiffs.
Indeed, application of the adverse domination doctrine under
a combination statute of repose/statute of limitations seems to have
been accepted by at least one court.242 The Kansas statute of
limitations for torts provides that a cause of action will accrue when
discovered but that "in no event shall an action be commenced
more than 10 years beyond the time of the act giving rise to the
cause of action." 23  In Resolution Trust Corp. v. Scaletty,244 the
Kansas Supreme Court adopted adverse domination as a variation
of the discovery rule under the discovery rule portion of the Kansas
limitation statute.24 5 Thus, it is clear that the proposal advocated
in this Comment could indeed work in practice.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has attempted to clear up some of the confusion
pervading application of the adverse domination doctrine to suits
brought by the RTC and the FDIC. By determining that the nature
of the adverse domination doctrine is most closely related to the
discovery rule, a uniform rule has been discerned for courts to
apply. Given that state law governs the tolling of statutes of
limitations under FIRREA, 24 6 it is especially important that federal
courts understand the origins of the doctrine. Knowing that
adverse domination is essentially a variant of the discovery rule, a
commence an action more than ten years after the date on which the product was
first purchased.").
241 See Heriot, supra note 12, at 962 (noting that this solution "is a particularly
interesting one in that it accommodates to some extent the changing times argument
without wholly sacrificing protection for the potential defendant").
2142 See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Scaletty, No. 72,230, 1995 WL 111986, at *6
(Kan. Mar. 17, 1995).
21S KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513(b) (1994).
244 No. 72,230, 1995 WL 111986 (Kan. Mar. 17, 1995).
245 See id. at *6.
246 See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
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federal court should consult state law surrounding the discovery
rule. Not only will this lead to a more uniform version of adverse
domination being applied in federal courts, it will also ease the
difficult position of a federal court asked to apply a doctrine not yet
adopted in the state in which it sits. The body of law on the
discovery rule is extensive in most states, and a federal judge who
understands that adverse domination is simply a variant of the
discovery rule will find her task much easier if she knows to consult
this body of law instead of attempting to mold state law in federal
court.
As the number of cases involving adverse domination grows, this
Comment should serve as a useful reference for understanding the
theoretical basis for and application of the doctrine. This Comment
should also further discussion and debate about the appropriate
balance between the plaintiff's right to recover for legitimate
injuries and the need for defendants, at some point, to feel secure
in their affairs. Adverse domination seems to be the most expansive
use of the discovery rule to date. As the balance tips increasingly
in favor of plaintiffs, it is time that courts, legislatures, and
academics reconsider the purposes, policies, and applications of
statutes of limitations. The literature on statutes of limitations is
disappointingly sparse. Ideally, this Comment will serve to revitalize
discussion of the important issues surrounding limitations on causes
of action.
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